Private military firms as instruments of U.S. foreign policy the case of Colombia by Boysen, Matthias
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2007-06
Private military firms as instruments of U.S. foreign
policy the case of Colombia
Boysen, Matthias













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS AS INSTRUMENTS OF U.S. 








 Thesis Advisor:   Jeanne Giraldo 
 Second Reader: Thomas Bruneau 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2007 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Private Military Firms as Instruments of U.S. 
Foreign Policy: The Case of Colombia 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Boysen, Matthias 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
This thesis assesses the costs and benefits of U.S. reliance on the private military industry in its assistance 
to Colombia.  U.S. policy in Colombia is characterized by an enormous military and financial effort to 
combat the drug trade and the violence of terrorist groups, which are heavily involved in the drug business.  
Private military firms (PMFs) play a major role in the fight against drugs, particularly in the U.S.-funded 
aerial eradication program.  In addition, the United States has relied on PMFs to assist in the 
transformation of the defense sector, which was a key part of Plan Colombia.  Given the importance of 
Colombia to U.S. foreign policy, it is essential to determine whether PMFs have contributed to or 
undermined U.S. objectives in the country.  In addition, the Colombian case sheds important light on the 
broader debate over the advisability of relying on PMFs as an instrument of foreign policy. The main 
argument is that even though PMFs have been subject to much greater regulation in the Colombian case 
than in other instances, the executive branch lacks the ability to oversee their activities adequately and 
there is still a significant deficit of accountability to the Congress and the public. 
 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
87 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
Private military industry, private military firms, private military companies, DynCorp, 
Colombia, contractors 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS AS INSTRUMENTS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: 
THE CASE OF COLOMBIA 
 
Matthias Boysen 
Lieutenant Commander, German Navy 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

























Professor Douglas Porch 
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
This thesis assesses the costs and benefits of U.S. reliance on the private 
military industry in its assistance to Colombia.  U.S. policy in Colombia is 
characterized by an enormous military and financial effort to combat the drug 
trade and the violence of terrorist groups, which are heavily involved in the drug 
business.  Private military firms (PMFs) play a major role in the fight against 
drugs, particularly in the U.S.-funded aerial eradication program.  In addition, the 
United States has relied on PMFs to assist in the transformation of the defense 
sector, which was a key part of Plan Colombia.  Given the importance of 
Colombia to U.S. foreign policy, it is essential to determine whether PMFs have 
contributed to or undermined U.S. objectives in the country.  In addition, the 
Colombian case sheds important light on the broader debate over the advisability 
of relying on PMFs as an instrument of foreign policy.  The main argument is that 
even though PMFs have been subject to much greater regulation in the 
Colombian case than in other instances, the executive branch lacks the ability to 
oversee their activities adequately and there is still a significant deficit of 
accountability to the Congress and the public. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In the last decade of the twentieth century a new era began as the global 
political landscape changed dramatically. The Cold War was over and old 
structures of interstate relationships which dominated foreign policy for the 
previous fifty years diminished in importance.1  In contrast to the hope of many 
people, it turned out that the world did not become a safer place. In fact, new 
conflicts emerged when the superpowers withdrew as they left a “power vacuum” 
in many countries.  Internal power struggles and ethnic conflicts broke out and 
led to a kind of warfare which is characterized by long lasting regional conflicts 
with no clear fronts and with actors others than states.2  Additionally, the 
worldwide decrease in military spending reduced some of the capabilities of 
regular forces as they experienced budget cuts in almost every sector.  With less 
military manpower and equipment, states had to reconsider the missions and 
tasks their regular forces could undertake. 
This altered military and political situation laid the foundation for the 
increase of the private military sector.3  In many developing countries, private 
military firms (PMFs) have filled the vacuum left by the state’s inability to provide 
security for its citizens.  At the same time, developed countries have come to rely 
increasingly on private military firms in the execution of their foreign policy.  The 
services offered by modern PMFs range from providing logistic support and 
training of military personnel to operational planning and assistance in combat 
operations. The increased reliance of the United States on PMFs has not gone 
unnoticed by scholars, policy analysts and actors in the international community. 
As the literature review discusses in more detail, the practice has been criticized 
                                            
1 In this paper I will refer to the year 1990 as the marking point for the end of the Cold War as 
it constitutes the end of the former bipolar system between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. 
2 In particular, countries which formerly were in the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union 
experienced internal wars.  The long, brutal war in ex-Yugoslavia serves as a good example. 
3 P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors- The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2003), p.49. 
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for a variety of reasons, ranging from wrongdoing by these forces to a more 
general concern over the lack of accountability of the private military sector. 
The purpose of the thesis is to assess the costs and benefits of U.S. 
reliance on the private military industry in its assistance to Colombia.  In many 
ways, the use of PMFs in Colombia is a “least likely” case to experience the 
abuses or transgressions that typically plague the sector. PMFs in Colombia do 
not provide warfighting capabilities, but rather operational support, which is 
presumably less prone to abuse.  U.S. assistance to Colombia was a key foreign 
policy issue prior to 9/11 and, as such, received a great deal of scrutiny from 
Congress and the public.  The U.S. Embassy in Colombia was well positioned to 
oversee the activities of U.S.-funded PMFs within the country, in contrast to the 
situation in post-conflict or newly democratic countries where there is little history 
of a U.S. presence.  Finally, while a great deal of aid was provided to Colombia, it 
did not reach the staggering level of spending in Iraq, which is presumably harder 
to monitor.  If, despite these expectations, the use of PMFs in Colombia proves 
to be problematic (i.e., has more costs than benefits), we should be especially 
concerned with the increasing reliance of the United States on the private military 
industry for the implementation of its foreign policy objectives.  If, in contrast, the 
U.S. has been able to use PMFs effectively in Colombia, then it might provide 
some useful lessons for how PMFs might be employed in an accountable fashion 
elsewhere in the world. 
U.S. policy in Colombia is characterized by an enormous military and 
financial effort to combat the drug trade and the violence of terrorist groups, 
which are heavily involved in the drug business.  The fight against these 
subjects, drug trafficking and terrorism, is evaluated of high importance as both 
are considered by the United States as a threat to national security.4  In 2001, 
Colombia was the origin of 90% of the cocaine and 75% of the heroin which was 
                                            
4 Gaston Chillier and Laurie Freeman, “Potential Threat: The New OAS Concept of 
Hemispheric Security”, WOLA Special Report, July 2005, p.2. 
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consumed in the United States5  PMFs play a major role in the fight against 
drugs in Colombia, particularly in the U.S.-funded aerial eradication program.  In 
addition, the United States has relied on PMFs to assist in the transformation of 
the defense sector, which was a key part of Plan Colombia.  Given the 
importance of Colombia to U.S. foreign policy, it is essential to determine 
whether PMFs have contributed to or undermined U.S. objectives in the country.  
In addition, the Colombian case sheds important light on the broader debate over 
the advisability of relying on PMFs as an instrument of foreign policy. 
A. OVERVIEW OF SOURCES AND CHAPTERS 
The debate over the use of the private military sector has increased in 
recent years, in particular following the publication of two seminal books on the 
topic: Corporate Warriors- The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry by P.W. 
Singer in 2003 and The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing 
Security by Deborah D. Avant in 2005.  Additional publications of these two 
authors also provide a detailed look into the issue of the private military industry 
and serve as a framework for this paper.  There is a limited amount of 
information on specific PMF activities in Colombia since providers of private 
military services do not release much information about their activities, preferring 
to avoid public scrutiny.  However, the U.S. Congress has required the State 
Department to provide annual reports on the activities of contractors in support of 
counternarcotics efforts in Colombia.  Although, most of these reports have not 
been made public, the reports on Fiscal Year (FY) 2002 and FY2006 contracts 
are available and provide an unusual and useful glimpse at the private military 
sector’s activities in Colombia.6 
                                            
5 Nina M. Serafino “Colombia: Conditions and U.S. Policy Options,” in CRS Report for 
Congress, updated February 12, 2001, 3. 
6 United States Department of State, “Report to Congress on Certain Counternarcotics 
Activities in Colombia,” Report to Congress Certain Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia, 
Submitted to the Congress by the Secretary of State, Pursuant to Section 694 (b) of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228), FY 2002 and FY 2006. 
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The thesis begins with an overview of the private military sector, showing 
how private actors are involved in military engagements and what kinds of 
services they offer.  Chapter II discusses the origins and the structure of the 
private military sector. It provides historical background of the first “warriors for 
hire”, followed by a description and classification of modern PMFs.  Reasons to 
hire private military firms are pointed out, and differences between the “classical” 
mercenary and modern private military firms are highlighted. Furthermore, 
Chapter II summarizes the debate over the use of private military firms.  Opinions 
diverge whether the private military industry is a useful supplement to regular 
forces or whether it undermines the monopoly of a state’s forces and therefore 
threatens the sovereignty of certain states.  The private military sector can help 
to relieve overtaxed armed forces and execute missions that bear a high political 
risk.  However, at the same time concerns about a lack of accountability when 
PMFs are either involved in human rights violations or act beyond the control of 
the client and fail to carry out the intended political goals.  The conclusion argues 
that due to the wide variety of services which modern private military companies 
offer, a general condemnation of these firms would be too easy, and it is 
necessary to examine each case individually in order to achieve an objective 
evaluation. 
The third chapter describes the role of PMFs in the implementation of U.S. 
policy in Colombia since 2000.  The chapter discusses the variety of services 
which the private military industry offers in Colombia and focuses on the activities 
of two major contractors that have worked in the country – DynCorp and Military 
Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI).  The fourth chapter then assesses the costs 
and benefits of the use of PMFs in Colombia by the U.S. government.  The first 
and second sections consider the impact upon the military and the executive 
branch more broadly.  The third and fourth sections examine the extent to which 
PMFs are held accountable to the rule of law, to Congress and the public.  
Overall, the chapter finds that even though PMFs have been subject to much 
greater regulation in the Colombian case than in other instances, the executive 
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branch lacks the ability to oversee their activities adequately and there is still a 
significant deficit of accountability to the Congress and the public.  Finally, 
Chapter V summarizes the thesis’ main points and offers policy prescriptions 
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II. THE PRIVATE MILITARY SECTOR 
This chapter presents information about the private military industry, which 
has played an increasingly important role in providing security and implementing 
U.S. foreign and security policy since the end of the Cold War.  It begins with a 
historical overview of the role of mercenaries and “warriors for hire”, followed by 
an examination and a classification of modern private military companies.  Two 
approaches of how to classify the private military sector are pointed out.  The first 
approach, based on Singer, distinguishes between three different kinds of private 
military companies which are classified by the services they offer:   The second 
approach refers to Avant’s classification.  Here, the companies are not arranged 
by the services they provide but according to the contracts signed with the client.  
Most importantly, the chapter summarizes the emerging debate over the 
advantages and disadvantages of using private military companies.  The costs 
and benefits enumerated here will be examined in more detail for the Colombian 
case in chapter 4. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
History has shown that the outsourcing of military tasks has a long 
tradition.  Individuals as well as groups offered their military service to rulers or 
countries in exchange for financial compensation.  The loyalty was not founded 
on moral aspects but exclusively on the contract between the server and the 
client.  For these fighters war was a profession with the purpose of personal 
enrichment.  This phenomenon of the “warrior for hire” was neither specific to a 
certain epoch nor a certain culture.  In fact, many wars in history were fought with 
the participation of mercenaries and, even today, mercenaries are actively 
involved in conflicts throughout the world. 
The first accounts of mercenaries date back as far as 2094 BC with 
references to the army of King Shulgi of Ur.  More detailed information, however, 
is available about mercenaries in ancient Greece and Rome.  The Greeks hired 
 8
specialists from other countries or city-states to fill their army.  Those specialists 
were famous for a specific military branch, for example slingers from Crete, 
horsemen from Thessaly and hoplites from Syracuse.  The Phoenicians were 
famous for their skills in naval combat and consequently they offered their 
services, too.  Alexander the Great took advantage of these potent seamen and 
hired a complete navy from the Phoenicians which consisted of 224 ships. 
Rome, too, relied upon hired warriors to fill the rank and file of their own 
army.  Numidians, Balearics, Gauls and Iberians were essential parts of the 
Roman army during the Punic Wars.  The number of outside specialists and 
warriors in what was originally a citizen army increased during the following 
centuries as it became harder and harder for Rome to recruit her own citizens.  
More and more non-Romans from all parts of the empire now were fighting for 
Rome.  By the end of the third century, the Roman army consisted of more 
Germanic soldiers than Roman citizens.7 
The period of the Hundred Years War (1337-1453) provided conditions 
which were favorable for the “warrior for hire.”  Standing armies were decimated, 
and this created a lack of centralized control.  Private soldiers organized 
themselves into groups offering their service to anyone who would pay them.  
These groups, known as the “Free Companies,” can be seen as “military 
societies like the trading guilds.”8 
It was at these times that Italian cities became increasingly wealthy and 
were looking for protection.  Lacking their own large territories where they could 
recruit soldiers they looked to the “free-lance” practice of soldiering in Northern 
Europe.  They imitated this system which was then called condottieri.  The cities 
signed contracts with captains who were responsible to form an army in order to 
either defend the city or to attack a rival city.  The success of this system, 
                                            
7 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p.21. 
8 Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2000), p.21. 
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however, is questionable, as, occasionally, “the captains of both sides were 
accused of arranging the show beforehand.”9 
Another kind of private military company was the Swiss mercenary unit.  
Originally these units emerged during the struggle for freedom in 1291 when 
Swiss cantons united to fight against foreign rule.  The main tactic used by the 
Swiss soldiers was the Swiss pike square.10  This kind of warfare proved to be so 
successful on the battlefield that Swiss mercenaries were hired by many 
countries.  Not only the French king but also the Pope in Rome benefited from 
the military expertise of the Swiss soldiers.  And still today, as part of tradition, 
the Pope relies on a Swiss regiment for his protection.11 
The Thirty Years War (1618-1648) constitutes a turning point in military 
history.  Up until then and during that war, most armies consisted of hired 
soldiers who fought for personal benefits without loyalty to nations but to the 
rulers who led them.  With the end of the war it became clear that this would 
change in the future.  “The concept of sovereignty won out against that of 
empire,”12 meaning that as a result “personal armies” were replaced by standing 
state armies which recruited the soldiers from among their own citizens.  This, 
however, did not mean that being a mercenary was an unprofitable profession 
from then on.  It was a long lasting process to convert pure mercenary armies to 
the nation-state armies, which relied on conscription both to provide personnel 
and to help create the modern citizen.  Military service became seen as a duty of 
the citizen rather than as a commodity to be sold. 
As a result of the implementation of the nation-state system, the need for 
mercenaries was greatly reduced and public attitudes about private soldiers 
became generally negative.  The motivation of the mercenary changed, too.  
                                            
9 Ropp, p.22. 
10 The pike square was similar to the ancient Greek phalanx.  Standing close together in 
square formation and armed with an 18-foot pike, the Swiss soldiers were even able to defend 
against a heavy cavalry charge. 
11 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p.27. 
12 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p.29. 
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Unlike the private soldier in former times, the “modern” mercenary is not engaged 
in long lasting enterprises anymore.  He is looking for fast and quick money 
combined with a certain wish for adventure.  Examples of this kind of men can be 
found in the wars on the African continent in the 1950s and 1960s, a time when 
the decolonization of many African countries took place.  And still today the 
individual private soldier is involved in several conflicts, even though modern 
private firms are more and more dominant.13 
The end of the Cold War was a turning point for the private military 
industry.  The old structures of the bipolar world disappeared and new, mostly 
internal, conflicts broke out.  Furthermore, a widespread downsizing of 
manpower and equipment of regular military forces provided a new momentum 
for the private military industry.  There was a ready supply of personnel to staff 
PMFs and a growing demand for such firms – to fill the “security gap” in 
developing countries and to help implement the foreign and security policies of 
developed countries and international organizations.  PMFs provide more 
services than the “classic” mercenary did as they not only sell “firepower” but 
also possess expertise in supply, logistics, military training and strategic 
consulting. 
B. THE PRIVATE MILITARY FIRM (PMF) 
Although PMFs and their employees do not like the term “mercenary” and 
therefore call themselves “military advisors” or “security consultants” they do offer 
military services in exchange for financial compensation without being bound by 
national ties.  The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I) from 08 June 1977 defines mercenaries as follows:14 
Article 47 Mercenaries  
                                            
13 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p.37. 
14 Website Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, http://www.drk.de/voelkerrecht/ access March 13, 2007. 
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1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a 
prisoner of war. 
2. A mercenary is any person who: 
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an 
armed conflict; 
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the 
desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on 
behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation 
substantially in excess of that promised or paid to 
combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed 
forces of that Party; 
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident 
of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict; 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the 
conflict; and 
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the 
conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces. 
Although the classic mercenary and PMFs share many similarities, there 
are also significant differences between them.  Modern PMFs are legal 
commercial enterprises which offer more varied and specialized services than 
the classic mercenary or the companies from past centuries.  They compete on 
the market like any other business.  Their product is security.  They differ from 
other security companies which, for example, guard buildings or industrial 
facilities, because of their military component. 
Over one hundred PMFs operate worldwide in more than 50 areas of 
conflict, offering their services to anyone who is willing to pay the bill, and thereby 
earning revenues of more than $100 billion annually.15  PMF clients range from 
                                            
15 P.W. Singer, “Have Guns Will Travel,” New York Times, July 21, 2003, at 
http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/fellows/singer20030721.htm  access March 13, 2007. 
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governments to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational 
corporations.  Governments use PMFs to support regular forces, establish 
internal security or as a tool to implement foreign policy.  NGOs mostly use PMFs 
in the supply and logistics sector and for securing facilities.  For multinational 
corporations which invest large sums in areas of conflict, the PMFs act as 
“investment enablers”, providing the security which the investors need in order to 
run their businesses.16  It is even possible now for the PMF to provide its 
services to multiple clients at the same time, something that was not possible 
historically.17  Also in contrast to former times, PMFs do not recruit their 
employees with dubious tactics or word of mouth “advertising” on the black 
market.18  Instead, the private military industry recruits employees in public 
advertisements searching for specialists with specific skills.19  The employees 
are former military specialists of national forces.  After the Cold War many 
nations downsized their military, which resulted in an oversupply of qualified 
military personnel.  Many PMFs could satisfy their demands for highly trained 
soldiers out of this pool, and recruited not only foot soldiers but also high ranking 
officers.  Some countries, for example the Soviet Union and South Africa, closed 
complete elite units, which in turn kept their connections and structures and 
opened own companies in the private military sector.  Together with the 
downsizing of the personnel came the reduction of military equipment.  
Consequently, massive amounts of arms swept into the private market.  The 
weaponry ranges from small arms up to completely functional battle tanks.  The 
private military sector was now able to purchase a wide spectrum of weapons in 
order to increase their capabilities for the services they offered.20 
                                            
16 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p.81. 
17 Ibid, p.46. 
18 Often enough recruiters in former times made false promises to get the new mercenary to 
sign the contract. 
19 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 47. 
20 Ibid, p.53-55. 
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The literature takes different approaches to characterizing PMFs.  Singer 
identifies three different sectors of the private military industry, based on the kind 
of service the company offers: Military Provider Firms, Military Consultant Firms 
and Military Support Firms.21  Military Provider Firms offer services which are 
directly linked to combat operations.  They provide personnel which engage in 
actual fighting; this could either be whole combat units or specialists like combat 
pilots.  Generally these firms offer two different kinds of contracts to the client.  
The client can choose between the “overall unit package” and the “force 
multipliers.”  If the client chooses the first type, the firm provides a tactical military 
unit which is able to conduct the mission completely on its own.  The second 
option, the “force multiplier,” is usually chosen by the client when it lacks 
expertise in specific military sectors.  The PMF provides either specialists who 
fight alongside the client’s troops, or it provides specially trained personnel which 
are skilled in leading military operations.22 
One example of a company in the provider sector is the South African firm 
Executive Outcomes (EO).  Executive Outcomes was active in Sierra Leone, 
fighting successfully against rebel organizations with an autonomous operating 
military unit.  It was hired in 1995 by the government of Sierra Leone in order to 
defeat Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF).  For the sum of $1.8 
million per month, the company provided a small battalion, including helicopter 
gunships and artillery.  Within a short period of time the 150 soldiers of EO swept 
the rebel forces out of the diamond fields they had occupied, and reclaimed the 
mining area in the name of Sierra Leone’s government.23  In this special case, 
the military firm sold a whole package to the client.  It deployed its own forces 
and acted completely alone.  The company did not supplement the regular 
forces; instead, they completely replaced them for this special mission.24 
                                            
21 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p.91. 
22 Ibid, p. 93. 
23 Dena Montague, “The Business of War and the Prospects for peace in Sierra Leone,” The 
Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume IX, Issue 1, Spring 2002, p. 233. 
24 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 94. 
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Military Consulting Firms are characterized by the advisory and training 
services they offer.  They provide programs for the restructuring of the client’s 
forces as well as analyses in the operational, strategical and organizational 
sector.  Officially these firms do not participate in combat operations.  However, 
by providing military know-how and training they do have influence on the 
battlefield without bearing the risks as the client does.  A government or state 
which intends to increase military capabilities or which conducts a restructuring of 
the armed forces is the typical client of a consulting firm.  The use of such a firm 
can be seen as a long-term investment for the client to improve military 
capabilities through the expertise of the company.  According to Singer, Military 
Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) and DynCorp are both examples of 
consulting firms, the former offering high level strategic advice and the latter 
providing expertise on  technical military issues.25 
Finally, Military Support Firms are in the rear of the battlefield, providing 
support to the client’s forces.  They do not participate in combat operations but 
are responsible for logistics, intelligence, transport and general supply.  The 
support sector is the largest of all sectors with many subsectors, but at the same 
time it is the one which draws the least public attention.  Singer states that this is 
the case because the supply sector does not appear to be as “mercenary” as the 
other sectors.26  This, according to Singer, is due to a common misunderstanding 
which considers logistics and supply separate from combat activities.  But even if 
companies which serve that sector do not execute primary military functions as 
fighting or combat planning, their part in the overall mission is vital to fulfill the 
given objectives. 
While Singer’s characterization of the wide range of services PMFs 
provide is useful, it overlooks the fact that an individual PMF may offer services 
in all three areas identified.  In response, Deborah Avant offers a somewhat  
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 15
different approach to categorizing PMFs, focusing on types of contracts rather 
than types of companies.27  Avant also distinguishes between internal and 
external security services. 
Internal security services mostly deal with policing tasks.  On top are 
companies who offer Armed Site Security.  This service, for example, is executed 
by the PMF Blackwater in Iraq.  Below that are companies which have contracts 
in Unarmed Site Security followed by Police Advice and Training which is 
conducted by DynCorp in Iraq.  At the bottom of Avant’s internal service 
classification are the contracts in the Crime Prevention and Intelligence Sector.28  
All these contracts regulate services which mainly are core functions of the 
regular police.  The companies which offer these services operate worldwide and 
clients hire them to, for example, protect mining sites and diamond companies or, 
like the U.N., to receive crime prevention services.29 
Regarding the external security services, Avant distinguishes between 
four different contracts which, all together, constitute the variety of services a 
military can provide.  Closest to the front line are contracts which provide Armed 
Operational Support.  In these cases, PMFs are on the battlefield and participate 
in combat activities.  The best known companies are Executive Outcomes and 
Sandline which gained public attention due to their missions in Sierra Leone and 
Angola, respectively.30  Next in the typology are contracts which are awarded for 
providing Unarmed Operational Support on the Battlefield and for Unarmed 
Military Advice and Training.  Finally in Avant’s classification are Logistical 
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“keep the machine running.”  That means these firms care for food supply, 
accommodations, transport, communications and all other issues related to 
logistics.31 
Avant would characterize the MPRI contract in support of Plan Colombia, 
which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, as “unarmed military 
advice and training”32 – similar to Singer’s classification of MPRI as a consulting 
firm.  In contrast, Avant classifies DynCorp’s contracts supporting crop 
eradication and aerial reconnaissance in Colombia, as “unarmed operational 
support on the battlefield.”33  This classification, based on contracts, is more 
accurate than Singer’s more general characterization of DynCorp as a consulting 
firm. 
C. THE DEBATE 
The rise of the private military sector has opened a discussion about the 
advantages and disadvantages of this kind of business.  Opinions diverge 
whether the private military sector is a blessing or a curse. 
Advocates of PMFs argue that they are a cost effective means of 
providing needed expertise for the multiple peacebuilding and peacekeeping 
missions that face the international community.  David Shearer notes that the 
costs of these operations are rising, economically and politically.  Therefore, he 
argues, “it may increasingly make sense for multilateral organizations and 
Western governments to consider outsourcing some aspects of these 
interventions to the private sector.”34  Similarly, Doug Brooks notes that certain 
private companies have gained quite some experience in peacekeeping 
operations.  These companies have now formed a consortium which is offering 
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help to the United Nations in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo.  He 
states that the consortium has the “means and motivation to carry out the full 
mandate by providing key services and it can do so more effectively and less 
expensively than the U.N. could.”35 
In contrast, Deborah Avant argues that governments should not delegate 
the use of force to the private military sector because it constitutes a threat to the 
state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force.  Specifically, she says that this 
sector “undermines the collective monopoly of the state over violence in world 
politics.”36  States give up the control and influence over the use of force when 
they continue to allow the privatization of violence.  Referring to the case of 
Congo she argues that there may be more destabilization in the region after the 
military contractors have left.  The reason for this concern is that local forces 
which have been trained by the contractors could pose a threat to political 
stability due to the lack of government control.37 
Relatedly, Anna Leander argues that public security structures are 
undermined with the increased reliance on PMFs.  The reliance on PMFs does 
not enhance safety and security but instead it leads to more violence and 
insecurity, especially in the weak states of Africa.38  Heavy reliance by the state 
on the private military industry undermines the legitimacy of public security 
orders and therefore it may be contested by violence.39  Furthermore, financial 
and human resources are diverted into the private sector.  This leaves public 
institutions with less money to fulfill their functions and with less manpower 
because soldiers prefer to work for the companies as the pay is much higher.40 
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From a different perspective, PMFs can be used in missions with a high 
political risk for the western community.  In situations where developed nations 
may be reluctant to commit their own troops, the international community can still 
bring military force to bear to keep the peace or encourage parties to a conflict to 
negotiate.  The downside of this is that countries can use mercenaries to hide 
their own involvement in conflicts and to avoid signaling the engagement of a 
state with the conflict.  For example, the Johnson administration wanted to stay in 
the background during the war in Congo in 1965.  Even though there was a 
political interest of the United States, Belgium and a hired mercenary force acted 
to execute U.S. policy.41  Furthermore, the mercenaries helped to take pressure 
off an overtaxed U.S. military which was heavily engaged in Vietnam.42 
Ken Silverstein argues that state control is reduced when private 
companies are hired because much information about the missions is kept under 
seal. Oversight by government agencies is reduced as this information often is 
“locked in the companies’ accounting books.”43  The state has limited 
opportunities to confirm if the intended political will is carried out. This could be a 
potential danger for the democratic process as state control is compromised.  
Furthermore, as Bruce D. Grant postulates, because many contracts between 
the state and the PMF are not accessible to the public, transparency in foreign 
policy is not present and the ability of the public and the legislature to “check and 
balance” executive actions is limited.  Consequently, PMFs shape the foreign 
policy of a state without the public or elected officials involved.  The result is that 
“foreign policy is made by default.”44 
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In reply, defenders of PMFs note that the firms operate within a legal 
framework which is the same as any “civilian” business.  The contracts between 
the provider and the client are very detailed and account for almost any issue.  
For example, in addition to describing the mission and the obligations of the 
client and the contractor, the contract also addresses issues like language 
requirements, health insurance and environmental issues.45 
Other concerns about the privatization of force are about regulation and 
accountability of the hired soldiers themselves.  Violations of human rights, 
criminal involvement and unnecessary use of force are potential side effects 
when using a private army.  For example, during the war in Congo in the 1960s 
the mercenary force was known for its brutality against its adversaries.  Journalist 
reports revealed that the mercenaries conducted executions and tortures which 
they portrayed in photos.46  Even today there are reports that some employees of 
PMF are involved in criminal activities.  For example, a lawsuit by a former 
DynCorp employee which was filed in Britain in 2001, revealed that DynCorp 
employees were participating in illegal sex trafficking during their presence in 
Bosnia.47 
The UN opposes mercenaries and private military companies which 
engage in combat operations as threats to human rights and to the sovereignty, 
political independence and territorial integrity of states.  The argument is that 
they are not politically connected to the society and therefore interfere with the 
right of people to self-determination.  Therefore, the UN issued a condemnation 
of mercenaries in 2001 which was in addition to a debate that had already lasted 
for several decades.48  In December 2003 the UN published a report submitted 
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by Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, Special Rapporteur, dealing with the use of 
mercenaries by private military companies.  The report states that international 
and domestic law needs to regulate the activities of private military companies.49  
It must be assured that these companies do not participate in combat activities 
and that they refrain from intervening in matters of public order and security, as 
this is the sole responsibility of the state.50 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that the idea of the “warrior for hire” has a long 
tradition in warfare.  During every epoch there were, and still are, private military 
actors who are willing to participate in combat operations as long as someone is 
paying for their services.  The main difference between the private military actors 
of former times and the PMFs of today is the organizational structure and the 
increased variety of services offered.  The “classic” mercenary acted for own 
personal benefits whereas modern companies are business entities which seek 
to increase the profits for the company.  The increased variety of services which 
private military companies offer today has led to a corresponding increase in the 
pool of potential clients.  In former times the mercenary needed war to conduct 
business.  To make a living he had to look for a client who was engaged in an 
armed conflict.  At the same time, the client had to find and then hire the 
mercenary in order to start a war.  This has partially changed today.  The private 
military industry of today does not necessarily depend on combat activities in 
order to sell its services.  Companies hired for Unarmed Operational Support on 
the Battlefield and Unarmed Military Advice and Training provide advisory and 
training services as well as services in the supply and intelligence sector.  These 
companies can fulfill their functions even in the absence of an armed conflict.  
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The client uses their services and expertise to improve troop capabilities and to 
support a variety of military missions.  Contracts for Armed Operational Support 
however, still need combat activities in order to be signed.  The service of 
companies awarded with this kind of contract is directly linked to fighting, 
whether the companies are hired to fight independently or together with the 
troops of the client. 
The increasing reliance of states on PMFs has not gone unnoticed by the 
public.  Among scholars there is an increased concern that negative 
repercussions may emerge with an increased reliance on the private military 
industry.  The main concerns are that democracy will be undermined and that 
the sovereignty of client states will be affected as they share their monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force with a private actor who is driven by economic 
principles.  In particular, critics argue that PMFs -- as a relatively new 
phenomenon -- have to this point largely escaped the legal, administrative, and 
democratic oversight that is necessary for them to be faithful executors of U.S. 
foreign policy.  Promoters of the private military sector, however, argue that 
PMFs bring much-needed military expertise to regions where the state has 
already surrendered its monopoly on the use of force to armed challengers. 
In a nutshell, there is no consensus on the advantages and 
disadvantages of PMFs.  Many aspects have to be considered in order to obtain 
a full and precise understanding of this subject.  The variety of companies in the 
private military sector together with the broad spectrum of available services 
make it difficult to come to a single solution about the curse or blessings of 
PMFs.  Each case has to be regarded on its own and should be evaluated 
separately.  Therefore, the next chapters concentrate on the use of PMFs to 
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III. THE CASE OF COLOMBIA 
This chapter describes the extent to which the United States relies on 
private military firms to implement its foreign policy in Colombia.  Since most 
contractors are engaged in providing support to counternarcotics activities, the 
focus is on that sector. The first two sections of the chapter describe the 
evolution of illicit cultivation in Colombia and the efforts of the U.S. and 
Colombian governments to combat it, both under the rubric of U.S. support for 
Plan Colombia (2000-2005), as well as parallel efforts to fight armed non-state 
actors from 2002 on.   The third section describes the scope and level of support 
that private military firms hired by the U.S. government provide to these efforts.  
The focus is on DynCorp, which is the main firm supporting eradication efforts in 
Colombia, and MPRI, a firm which attempted to provide strategic consulting 
services to the Colombian Ministry of Defense.  Chapter 4 will assess the costs 
and benefits of using these firms. 
A. SITUATION IN COLOMBIA 
The situation in Colombia is characterized by a long lasting internal 
conflict which the country has endured for about four decades, and which is 
therefore the longest conflict on the Latin American continent.51  The four main 
actors who are involved in this conflict are Colombia’s regular forces, the recently 
demobilized paramilitaries AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) and the two 
main guerrilla movements FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia) and ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional).  At the beginning of the 
conflict, the international community interpreted the internal challenge in terms of 
the East-West conflict during the Cold War.  However, with the rise of the 
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cocaine trade in the 1980s, the end of the Cold War and the terrorist acts of 
September 11, 2001, the focus has been on drug trafficking and terrorism.52 
In the 1960s and 1970s thousands of peasants fled to the southern part of 
Colombia into the unpopulated region of the Amazon basin.  The reasons for this 
migration were the existing violence and the unequal distribution of land.  At their 
new settlements the peasants received little support from the Colombian 
government.  No basic services were established, credits to help set up 
businesses were not provided, and the region lacked the infrastructure for basic 
trade.  The farmers soon realized that planting legal crops did not cover their 
expenses.53 
The solution was to plant coca, which became a viable crop in the late 
1970s and early 1980s.  Now the peasants were able to sell their harvest for a 
good price and there were more than enough buyers for this product.  Soon, the 
FARC began to charge levies on coca cultivation to finance the movement.  In 
1999 it was estimated that up to $100 million of drug money per year was 
generated.54  The money from the drug production enabled the guerillas to 
increase their fighting capabilities and manpower. 
Coca cultivation in Colombia increased strongly during the second half of 
the 1990s, as successful counterdrug efforts in Peru and Bolivia led Colombian 
cocaine producers to look to cultivators in their own country for leaf.  In 1995, 
126,000 acres were under coca cultivation; this increased to 251,000 acres in 
1998 and to 302,000 acres in 1999.  With these numbers, Colombia surpassed 
the two other large cultivators of coca, Peru and Bolivia, and remains the main 
cocaine supplier to the United States.  In 2001, Colombia was the origin of 90% 
of the cocaine and 75% of the heroin which was consumed in the U.S.55 
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The increase in cultivation benefited the FARC directly since it occurred 
primarily in southern Colombia where the FARC was traditionally strong.  In 
addition, the FARC was able to expand its activities in the drug business at the 
time the conflict escalated, beginning in 1996.  Having taxed coca production 
earlier in the 1980s, the FARC later went deeper into the drug business, 
acquiring its own coca plantations and processing plants and even attempting to 
branch out into international trafficking by establishing contact with drug 
organizations like the Mexican Tijuana cartel.  This expansion of FARC drug 
activities was facilitated by the Colombian government’s successful efforts to 
dismantle the Medellín cartel in 1993 and the Cali cartel in 1995.  With the drug 
organizations destroyed there was a vacuum in the drug business which the 
FARC – and also the paramilitaries -- were more than willing to fill.  Indeed, a 
great deal of the FARC-paramilitary clashes since 1996 have been over territory 
and working farmers. 56 
Increased revenues from the drug trade allowed both the FARC and 
paramilitaries to expand in the 1990s, although government efforts to combat 
both actors have led to a decrease in their numbers in more recent years. 
Between 1990 and 2000 the FARC increased by 5,000 members to a strength of 
17,000.  Similarly, the paramilitaries numbered 5,000 by the year 2000, when 
they had started with only several hundred members in the beginning of the 
1990s.57  As of April 2005, the State Department estimates that the number of 
FARC members is 12,000 with several more thousand supporters.  Press 
reports, however, indicate that FARC membership is between 12,000 and 
18,000.  Estimates of paramilitary strength vary greatly.  The State Department 
put the numbers of AUC members between 8,000 and 11,000 in 2003, when 
paramilitary leaders agreed to a demobilization process with the government.  In 
contrast, the numbers published in press reports were much higher, up to 20,000 
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members.  Surprisingly, more than 30,000 members of the AUC had demobilized 
as of April 2006 when the demobilization process officially ended.58  More than 
2,000 members are believed to remain active as they did not participate in the 
disarmament process.59 
B. U.S. SUPPORT FOR PLAN COLOMBIA 
U.S. policy in Colombia is characterized by an enormous military and 
financial effort in order to combat the drug trade which fuelled the activities of 
armed non-state actors within the country.  Plan Colombia, initiated during the 
administration of President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002), provides a broad and 
long-term strategy against drug trafficking. Overall, the goals of the U.S. are to 
establish stability in the Andean region, to protect human rights, and to provide 
humanitarian aid.60  U.S. support for Plan Colombia was signed into law on July 
13, 2000.  Plan Colombia consisted of programs to strengthen the institutions 
necessary for fighting the drug threat, namely the military, the police and the 
judicial system. 
Between 2000 and 2005, the United States spent approximately $2.8 
billion to fight drug cultivation and provide development assistance.  Additional 
financial support for Colombia has come from the Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF) program and from the DODs central counternarcotics account.  Adding the 
financial support of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), FMF and DOD, the 
total amount spent by the U.S. support to Colombia is $4.5 billion.61  For the year 
2006 Congress provided $469.5 million for the assistance to Colombia.  The  
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main portion of the money, $310.9 million, was for interdiction.  Alternative 
development received $131.2 million and $27.4 million went into judicial 
programs.62 
Furthermore, Plan Colombia allows the use of military force to fight drug 
traffickers and inevitably it aims at peasant farmers who would be motivated to 
abandon the planting of coca and poppies.63  Regarding coca cultivation, Plan 
Colombia had a goal of reducing it by 50%.64  As of 2003 it can be stated that 
this goal so far has been achieved.  According to an estimation of the United 
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) coca production has decreased by 
47% since 2000.65  In the year 2000, 336.550 acres of coca crops were under 
cultivation.  Until 2003 the numbers decreased due to spraying and aerial 
fumigation steadily, so that in 2003 281.323 acres of coca crops were cultivated.  
The cultivation of coca poppy also decreased with 18.533 acres in 2000 and 
5.189 in 2003.  However, as of the year 2004 the coca cultivation almost 
remained the same as in 2003.  The reason for that is seen in a massive 
replanting of already eradicated crops.66 
The amount of coca crop eradicated is as follows: In 2000, 117,054 acres 
were eradicated and 328,191 in the year 2003.  At the same time, 22,867 acres 
of coca poppy was eradicated in 2000 and 9,464 acres in 2003.67  
In a recently released note of March 2007, the Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs stated that according to the Colombian 
government 213.724 hectares of coca has been eliminated in 2006.  Of this 
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amount 171.613 hectares were destroyed by aerial spraying and the remaining 
42.111 hectares have been destroyed by manual eradication.  Up to now there 
are no 2006 estimates for coca under cultivation available, yet.  In 2005, 
however, 144,000 hectares of coca have been cultivated.68 
From the beginning of U.S. support to Colombia, many members of 
Congress were concerned that the United States might get drawn into 
Colombia’s internal conflict and the country would become “another Vietnam.”  In 
particular, members of Congress, among them Senator Robert Byrd and 
Representatives Ike Skelton and Gene Taylor, saw the danger of an unlimited 
increase of U.S. forces in Colombia.  As a result, strict limits were put on the 
number of U.S. personnel, both civilian and military, allowed in Colombia.69  The 
personnel cap would serve as a kind of “tripwire” for Congress with the intention 
to keep an eye on the expansion of U.S. involvement in Colombia.  Concerns 
were that U.S. troops would be drawn into a complicated conflict from which, 
once engaged into, a retreat might be difficult.  To avoid this, the military 
engagement in Colombia should be limited by the cap.70  At the beginning of 
support for Plan Colombia in 2000, no more than 500 active military personnel 
and 300 private contractors were allowed in Colombia.  After a change in 2001 
the limits were reapportioned to 400 each, military and civilian personnel.71  In 
addition, from the beginning of U.S. assistance to Plan Colombia in 2000, both 
U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilian contractors were forbidden from 
participating in combat operations.   
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During the year 2004 a discussion between the Bush administration and 
the Congress emerged as the government requested an increase in personnel 
limits for 2005 to 800 military personnel and 600 civilian contractors. Prior to 
2004, an increase of personnel in Colombia was not on the agenda of DOS and 
DOD.  In fact, both departments regularly assured that the existing limits were 
satisfactory and that there was no need for a higher number of personnel in 
Colombia.  This, however, changed after the Uribe administration implemented 
“Plan Patriota” at the end of 2003, which was a large-scale offensive by 
Colombian forces directed against guerrilla strongholds in the south of 
Colombia.72 More U.S. personnel was needed in order to satisfy demands for 
training and planning assistance because of the broadened engagement of the 
Colombian military.73 
Congress, however, was concerned about a raise of the cap.  Members 
were worried that this would bring more burden on the overtaxed military which 
was at the same time heavily engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.  They also feared 
that the United States would become more and deeper involved in the ongoing 
conflict in Colombia.74 Despite this concern, on October 8, 2004, the request of 
the Bush administration was granted.75 
Since the restrictions on contractors only apply to U.S. citizens, PMFs 
(with the blessing of the State Department) have hired foreign employees to work 
in Colombia.  With this practice, it is consequently possible for the private military 
companies to obey the rules on the one hand and to increase their manpower on 
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the other hand.76  Even though the laws specify that only U.S. citizens count 
against the contractor cap, the PMF practice of employing foreign workers has 
been criticized by some members of Congress.  Among those critics is 
Representative Janice Schakowsky who argues that the practice subverts 
Congressional intent to limit U.S. involvement in Colombia: “This seems to be a 
loophole around the cap, a way to get around them.”77 
Shortly after the implementation of Plan Colombia and the troop cap 
approximately 400 civilian contractors were working in Colombia.  However, less 
than half were U.S. citizens.  Of 335 DynCorp employees in Colombia, 200 were 
not U.S. citizens.  Other companies which were hired to support the war against 
drugs, for example Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., Northrop 
Grumman and Lockheed Martin, had about 80 U.S. citizens in the country which 
made it a total of at least 400 civilian contractors. 
C.  PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS IN COLOMBIA 
The United States employs a wide range of private military firms to 
implement its policy in Colombia. More than fifteen different companies with more 
than thirty awarded contracts have been engaged in Colombia as of 2003.78  For 
FY2002, $499 million were provided for counterdrug efforts in Colombia.  
Approximately 30% of the funds were provided for hiring contractors, namely 
$149,385,802.  DynCorp’s contract for FY2002 was worth $79.2 million which 
was 53% of the total amount spent for private contractors.  The financial scope 
for counterdrug efforts increased in FY2006 to $586.7 million.  The proportion 
spent for the private military industry almost doubled to 53.2%.  From the portion 
spent for contractors, $312,118,179 DynCorp, again, was the biggest recipient.  
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The contract awarded to DynCorp totaled to the sum of $164,260,877.  Even 
though the absolute figures increased about half, DynCorp’s proportion of the 
overall funds remained about the same with 52.6%.79 
Although no firms provide “armed support on the battlefield,” they do 
provide a wide range of services that Avant characterizes as “unarmed 
operational support on the battlefield” and “unarmed military advice and training.”  
These services range from training personnel and maintaining equipment to 
operating special equipment for certain missions.  For example, Northrop 
Grumman Systems Corporation, California Microwave Systems is active in the 
intelligence sector.  California Microwave Systems (CMS) operates an airborne 
system which gathers information about groups connected to the drug business 
via Imagery and Communications intelligence.  The risk for these missions is 
considered to be moderate to high; CMS personnel are required to complete 
jungle survival training in order to deal with the possibility of a downed aircraft. 
Another company which is present in Colombia is Lockheed Martin.  This 
company is the Pentagon’s number one contractor, with approximately $94 
million in contracts signed between 1998 and 2003, though in Colombia it has 
worked for the Department of State as well.80  Among other services, the 
company provides maintenance personnel and logistic support for the Colombian 
National Police and its Black Hawk helicopters.  It also provides instructor pilots, 
trains Colombian maintenance personnel and installs force protection systems.81 
The following sections focus on the private military firms DynCorp and 
MPRI.  DynCorp is chosen because it plays a major role in U.S. aid to Colombia 
and is representative of companies (like Northrop Grumman and Lockheed  
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Martin) that provide unarmed operational support.  MPRI is discussed as 
representative of a firm that offers consulting and advising services at the 
strategic level.   
Although private military firms and the government tend to be very 
restrictive in issuing detailed data on PMF activities to the public, it is possible to 
piece together a story using information from United States Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) reports, State Department required reporting, 
monitoring by non-governmental organizations, newspaper articles, official 
statements and PMF websites. 
1. DynCorp 
DynCorp has been engaged in Colombia since 1991, and there is a good 
deal of information available in regard to their activities in Latin America.  The 
company is one of the world wide leaders of military security services, with over 
20,000 employees and a presence in more than 550 locations around the 
globe.82  In 2007, its annual revenue was $2.1 billion.83  The company has 
contracts with a wide range of government agencies including the Department of 
Defense, Department of State, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department 
of Justice, Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Communications 
Commission, Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department.84 
DynCorp was founded in 1946 by pilots returning from World War II.  
Initially the company was in the air cargo business; at that time the company was 
named California Eastern Airways, using the military contacts of the pilots to 
establish business, and its first jobs were to fly supplies to Asia during the 
Korean War.  During the following years the Virginia-based company increased 
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its revenues and the range of services offered, making it the 13th largest military 
contractor in the United States.  DynCorp merged in March 2003 with a 
technology service company, Computer Sciences Corporation, which acquired 
DynCorp for almost $1 billion. 
Since 1991, the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has hired DynCorp to support eradication efforts 
undertaken in the Andean region by the department’s Aviation Program.  A five-
year contract, worth approximately $99 million, was signed in 1991.  Between 
1996 and 1998, State signed DynCorp to three interim contract extensions, 
before awarding a second five-year contract in 1998, worth approximately $170 
million.85  In 2005, DOS awarded DynCorp with a third eradication and 
interdiction contract which was worth $174 million annually.86 
The contracts state that DynCorp is responsible for maintaining U.S. 
aircraft used in the drug eradication program.  Furthermore, DynCorp provides 
training in maintaining the aircraft and conducts initial pilot training.  All this takes 
place on U.S soil-namely, at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida.  Additionally, 
DynCorp maintains and flies aircraft used for eradication in Latin America, and 
trains Bolivian, Colombian and Peruvian personnel to perform these tasks, too.  
DynCorp also trains Colombian army personnel under the State Department’s 
Plan Colombia helicopter program. 
As of July 31, 2001, the State Department’s Office of Aviation had 101 
aircraft and helicopters assigned to the Aviation Program.  The majority of them 
were stationed in Colombia.  The fleet in Colombia consisted of 2 C-27 transport 
aircraft, 5 OV-10D and 5 T-65 eradication aircraft, 6 UH-1H and 40 UH-1N 
helicopters and one C-208 for crop identification.87 
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As of 2001 DOS had 24 staff members assigned to the Aviation Program.  
Of these staff members three were stationed in Washington, D.C., for overall 
coordination and administrative support, and 11 members were at Patrick Air 
Force Base, Florida, for managing the aviation program for the overseas 
locations and overseeing the activities of DynCorp.  On the Latin American 
continent 10 staff members (four in Bolivia and three each in Colombia and Peru) 
were assigned as aviation advisers to oversee DynCorp activities.88 
At the same time DynCorp had a total of 545 employees to work within 
that program.  Of those, 154 were stationed at Patrick Air Force Base from where 
they managed and supported other DynCorp personnel in Latin America.  
Additionally they maintained the aircraft belonging to the program and provided 
initial pilot training.  In Bolivia and Peru DynCorp had 20 and 27 employees, 
respectively, who were assigned to train helicopter mechanics for the aircraft in 
those countries.  The majority of DynCorp personnel, however, was stationed in 
Colombia where 344 employees worked as pilots, mechanics, and managers, 
training Colombian Army personnel and supporting the Colombian National 
Police eradication program.  Less than a third of these workers were U.S. 
citizens, and hence did not count against the contractor cap89  These numbers 
show clearly that DynCorp is mainly responsible for the execution of the Aviation 
Program.  DOS only provided limited personnel for planning and supervision.  
DynCorp flies the aircrafts for eradication, maintains the hardware and trains 
local forces. 
Flying eradication missions over insurgent-controlled territory is risky – in 
the year 2000 alone, over 60 INL aircraft were struck by ground fire -- and led 
DynCorp personnel into the direct line of fire.90  The risk was so great that the 
GAO was asked in 2004 to conduct an investigation into the safety of the State 
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Department’s Aviation Program. 91   According to the report DynCorp personnel 
are involved in providing security on eradication missions.  Each eradication 
aircraft was assigned two or three helicopter gunships to provide air coverage.  
Each helicopter is manned with U.S. contractors and members of the Colombian 
National Police.  The tasks of the civilian contractors is either piloting the 
helicopter or acting as a medic.  The job of the gunners is executed by a crew 
member of the Colombian National Police.  In 2001, DynCorp provided two 
contractor pilots and two crew members for the search and rescue aircraft.92 
Additionally, it was agreed that intelligence information about hostile armed 
forces in eradication zones would be supplied directly to the State Department’s 
Office of Aviation and DynCorp.  Furthermore, DynCorp was authorized to hire 
six more employees whose tasks were to gather and analyze intelligence in order 
to make future eradication missions safer.93 
In addition to providing security, DynCorp also has been involved in 
Search and Rescue missions, which come close to qualifying as combat 
operation.  According to an ex-employee of DynCorp, the company has some 
employees “of the highest caliber--Delta guys, SEAL team guys…” posted in 
Colombia.94  Those “guys” are trained specialists in anti-terror, evacuation, close 
combat and reconnaissance missions.  Furthermore, the ex-employee claimed 
that DynCorp personnel were involved in rescue missions of army personnel 
whose tasks were not related to the counternarcotics program.  Singer, too, 
mentions that DynCorp is engaged in more kinds of operations than just crop 
eradication.  In February 2001, a Colombian military helicopter was shot down by 
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guerrilla forces.  DynCorp launched a Search and Rescue (SAR) mission with 
armed special forces and helicopter gunships.  During this mission, the gunships 
shot at enemy ground forces while other helicopters rescued the downed crew.  
DynCorp did not issue a statement for this incident.95 
2. MPRI 
Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) is one of the best known 
companies in the private military industry, working both for the United States 
government and clients worldwide.  The company was founded in 1987 by high-
ranking ex-U.S. military officers and many recruited employees have had high 
positions in the U.S. military.  Among the founders and employees of MPRI are: 
Carl Vuono, General, U.S. Army, Ret., former Chief of Staff of the United States 
Army (1987-1991); Harry E. Soyster, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Ret., former 
head of the Defense Intelligence Agency (1988-1991); Crosbie E. Saint, General, 
United States Army, Ret., former Commander in Chief Central Army Group 
Europe (1988-1992). 
MPRI was awarded several contracts by the United States government to 
help implement its policy in Colombia.  The company was hired to provide advice 
to the Colombian government, to national police forces and the Colombian 
military.  At the early stage of Plan Colombia, MPRI and the Colombian 
government signed an agreement for assessment work which was worth 
$850,000.  The assessment work would last six weeks and MPRI was supposed 
to assist the Colombian government in developing a three-phase plan which 
would be realized after the aid package was completely financed.  Later, MPRI 
managed to get another contract worth over $6 million for conducting a second 
project.  In mid 2000, MPRI sent a team to Colombia to work with the Colombia 
national police and the military.  Led by a former U.S. Army general, the MPRI 
employees and the Colombians engaged in several areas including military 
                                            
95 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 208. 
 37
training, logistics and intelligence.96  Located at the Colombian Armed Forces 
High Command in Bogotá, MPRI employees worked together with Colombian 
staff officers and developed recommendations which should improve the 
performance of the Colombian military.97  This project basically was very similar 
to a mission in the Balkans where MPRI was hired by the Croatian government. 
In the mid 90’s the young Croatian Republic hired MPRI with the objective 
to get assistance in creating a professional military.  Croatia was among the first 
which separated from former Yugoslavia and suffered severely under attacks 
from the Serbian minority out of the region Krajina.  Those attacks were 
supported by Yugoslav military forces which made the situation for Croatia even 
worse.  After a recommendation of the Pentagon, the Croatia government 
contacted MPRI and awarded the company two contracts which had the overall 
goal to increase the capabilities of the Croatian forces.  In following operations 
the Croatian forces could achieve tremendous victories over Serb forces and 
literally swept away Serb defenses.  After this success which was surprising for 
many actors, U.S. officials and the MPRI management downplayed the role of 
MPRI.  However, military experts recognized that without the assistance of MPRI 
the Croatian military would not have been able conduct the military operations in 
this professional manner.98 
In Colombia, though, the government was not as satisfied with the work of 
MPRI as the Croatian government was.  Consequently, the contract between the 
Colombian government and MPRI did not last for the planned timeframe.  The 
contract was terminated in May 2001 by the Colombian side because the team 
which MPRI had sent had no Spanish speakers and lacked sufficient knowledge 
and expertise for the scenario which prevailed in Colombia.  The 
recommendations presented by MPRI were seen on the Colombian as either 
from minor importance or inappropriate.  For example, “apply appropriate military 
                                            
96 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 133. 
97 The Center for Public Integrity “Colombia: Outsourcing War” 
98 Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 125-126. 
 38
capability prudently,” and “accurate and timely delivery of mail enhances the 
quality of life for the men and women in the field,” were some phrases articulated 
in MPRI’s advice.99 Obviously, as the mission in Croatia has shown, MPRI’s 
employees are more proficient in dealing with traditional conflicts than with low –
intensity conflicts.100 
D. CONCLUSION 
 The aim of U.S. engagement in Colombia is the fight against drugs and 
terrorism.  PMFs and especially DynCorp with its engagement in the eradication 
program play an important role in implementing U.S. foreign policy towards 
Colombia.  Given the troop cap, it is very likely that at many times more 
contractors than military personnel have been active in Colombia.  This is 
particularly the case since PMFs have been able to hire non-U.S. citizens for 
their activities in Colombia, thus circumventing congressionally-imposed limits on 
contractor personnel. 
While DynCorp seems to have performed its primary eradication mission 
competently, it has also been tasked with gathering intelligence information about 
rebel forces in eradication zones, conducting reconnaissance flights in order to 
obtain a picture about coca plantations, piloting gunships during eradication 
missions and conducting search-and-rescue operations.  All these missions, in 
particular the latter two, are risky and veer close to the prohibited engagement in 
combat activities.  The mission which had the lowest risk level -- MPRI’s task to 
work with the Colombian Ministry of Defense to develop a strategic plan for 
supporting Plan Colombia -- failed due to the incompetence of the company. 
The following chapter goes beyond issues of competence to address in 
more detail the extent to which the use of PMFs in Colombia contributes to a 
foreign policy which is both effective and in conformance with norms of 
democratic accountability. 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY IN COLOMBIA 
This chapter assesses the costs and benefits of using private military firms 
as key agents for implementing U.S. policy in Colombia. First, the implications of 
the use of PMFs for the military will be presented as, generally, PMFs are hired 
to execute missions which originally are the responsibility of the military.  Is the 
military in rivalry with the private military industry or is the use of PMFs a 
welcome assistance for overtaxed forces?  Among other items this section points 
out how the use of PMFs affects the long-term flexibility and capabilities of both 
the U.S. and Colombian armed forces.  The second section looks more broadly 
at the implications for the executive branch of relying on PMFs to implement its 
foreign policy.  It uses internal government documents and GAO reports to show 
that state reliance on PMFs in Colombia has not been cost effective and that the 
state has been largely ineffective in overseeing PMF activities.  In addition, the 
reliance on contractors creates dependencies and risks that the state has not 
fully considered. 
The third section highlights the legal vacuum in which PMFs work, leading 
to a lack of accountability as national and international laws have not yet been 
adequately adjusted to govern the actions of PMFs.  Finally, the chapter explores 
the impact the private military industry has on the democratic principle of checks 
and balances, undermining the ability of Congress (and the public) to access the 
information necessary to oversee the implementation of foreign policy.  In 
addition, the behind-the-scenes influence of PMFs on the making of foreign 
policy arguably undermines the responsiveness of policy makers to the public. 
The chapter concludes by noting that although the United States has 
experienced some minor disadvantages by using PMFs as a tool in the execution 





A. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MILITARY 
One problem that emerges with the increasing privatization of the military 
sector is a growing loss of certain control functions and specific capabilities of the 
regular forces.101  A study on the outsourcing of governmental services has 
found that institutions which have lost the capacity to execute specific services 
become more and more dependent on the private industry.  In the long run these 
governmental institutions will lose the knowledge and expertise to control and to 
evaluate the privately offered services, including pricing structures, as they lack 
competent personnel which would be able to maintain oversight.102  Limited 
capabilities in specific areas could have negative consequences for the military 
and the state regarding foreign policy and security issues due to the dependence 
on private contractors.  This is an undesired development because the military 
loses the flexibility to act on its own and to execute its mission independent of the 
market situation. 
While the loss of capacity is usually a long-run development, the United 
States General Accounting Office (GAO) [now the Government Accountability 
Office] has suggested that this is also a concern in the short run, given the 
Department of Defense’s increasing reliance on contractors for “vital services.”103  
Does the military have the capability and flexibility to proceed without support 
from the outside and is it able to find alternatives within a short period of time? 
The GAO study shows that the Department of Defense (DOD) has failed to 
enumerate these vital services and has not developed an emergency plan in 
case these contractors withdraw from the contracts.104  With more than 15 
civilian companies helping to implement U.S. aid in Colombia it is unlikely that all 
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contracts would cease at the same time. However, some companies, for example 
DynCorp, are in key positions for certain operations (e.g., the aerial eradication 
program). 
Military contractors also create a dilemma for the regular military when 
they engage in activities where they encounter enemy fire.  This raises the 
question of whether the military is responsible for the protection of civilian 
contractors and how to handle situations which have a dangerous potential.105  
This issue is discussed in the U.S. military, however, it seems that no solution 
has been found, yet.106  In Colombia, employees of PMFs frequently encounter 
fire from rebels, especially when they are engaged in the aerial eradication of the 
illicit coca and poppy fields that are a source of financial support for the 
guerrillas.  The rescue of three contractors taken hostage during one of these 
excursions has now become SOUTHCOM’s priority mission in Colombia.107 
The training of military personnel by private military companies affects 
U.S. forces as well as the Colombian army.  This can lead to a further decrease 
of capabilities as more money is invested in the training capacity of the private 
company rather than that of the national military.  In the long run the forces may 
not be capable to provide qualified training on their own.  This could result in the 
perception that training is no longer a core task of the regular forces and 
therefore preferences to focus on high-tech warfare are reinforced.108 
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In addition, private military companies often lure away highly trained and 
specialized personnel from the regular forces by offering higher salaries.  The 
recruitment and training of this personnel normally is very expensive and time 
consuming and the PMFs benefit from the large initial investment in this made by 
the tax payers.  High senior military officials already complain that the migration 
from the regular forces into the private military sector has increased 
massively.109  This affects both the military of the country employing the PMFs, 
as well as the military of the country receiving the assistance.  In the case of 
Colombia, a GAO report notes that in January 2003 65 Colombian Army 
personnel were chosen to receive additional training after the completion of a 
basic helicopter maintenance course.  Twenty-two of the selected personnel did 
not attend the training and neither the Colombian Aviation Battalion nor the U.S, 
Military Group could account for their whereabouts.110  Similarly, of 19 
Colombian Army personnel trained as pilot-in-command on UH-1N helicopters, 
only one showed up for duty.  As with the Colombian mechanics, it was not 
possible to locate them.111  Other sources claim that these individuals have left 
the Colombian armed forces in order to work for private military companies like 
DynCorp.112  The financial offers of the private military industry are very lucrative 
and attractive.  DynCorp offers a pilot $119,305 a year whereas a contractor 
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wages for members (as opposed to contractors) of the security services are even 
lower, with Colombian National Police helicopter pilots earning salaries as low as 
$29,000 annually.114 
The participation of so many private companies in providing U.S. military 
assistance to Colombia may also decrease the relevance of the military as it is 
partially replaced by PMFs as an executive institution.  One purpose of U.S. 
military aid to Colombia is the establishment of a close contact between the U.S. 
military and Colombian forces.  This military-to-military contact, however, is to a 
certain degree reduced in favor to a corporate-to-military contact.  With less 
military-to-military contact it becomes more difficult to build alliances between the 
forces and “the ability to conduct coalition operations based on past mutual 
training experience would also be lowered.”115 
B. OVERALL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 
From a narrow economic perspective, it may make sense for the U.S 
government to use PMFs for certain operations.  As a client, the government 
buys the “product”, in this case service, from a company and receives the 
“outcome” that means the execution of its intended political will if everything goes 
well and according to plan.  It is a “one time payment” as, in contrast, to the much 
larger investment it would otherwise have to make to maintain a standing army 
large enough to implement the services that are contracted out. 
While there is some merit to this argument, the cost savings provided by 
contractors are less obvious when contractors are allowed to over-bill the 
government or when the U.S. government must continue to pay contractors for 
services that should have been taken over by the personnel of aid recipient 
countries.  In the case of Colombia, internal State Department audits of DynCorp 
operations revealed that the company overcharged in some cases and misspent 
public funds in other cases.  For example, one 2005 State Department audit 
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revealed that DynCorp over-billed the U.S. government by more than $1.8 million 
for diverse disbursements to its employees in Peru and Colombia.116  Audits from 
the 1990s, obtained by The Dallas Morning News under the Freedom of 
Information Act, revealed a longer-term pattern of overbilling and deficient 
accounting practice.117 
In addition to overbilling, the use of contractors can be expensive rather 
than cost effective when the government relies on them over a long time period 
instead of investing in partner nation capabilities.   
This adds to the fact that even after years of training Colombian pilots still 
are not able to replace DynCorp in the aerial spraying missions, even though this 
was required in a contract DynCorp signed with the State Department in 1995.  
Three years later, a study by the GAO pointed out that there could have been 
significant cost savings as the costs of supporting DynCorp in FY1996 with $6.6 
million increased dramatically to $36.8 million in FY1999.118 
A possible benefit of hiring private military companies for the executive 
branch is that it allows the government to reduce the visibility of certain mission 
outcomes to the public.  As mentioned earlier, the eradication missions executed 
by DynCorp in Colombia are not without risks.  The aircrafts flown by civilian 
employees are armed and the helicopter gunships for their protection have been 
involved in several firefights with the rebels.  Even though some DynCorp 
aircrafts have been downed by enemy fire, killing DynCorp employees, there has 
been “no public outcry in response to these losses.”119  Consequently, the U.S. 
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government faces less public critique and attention than it would if American 
soldiers were killed.  In short, the government can intervene in Colombia without 
worrying about the electoral consequences.  Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney 
(D) criticized the U.S. government exactly for this matter when she wrote in an 
open letter to the Secretary of State Colin Powell: 
If these private military corporations are being used to avoid public 
scrutiny and the bad publicity that might ensue from body bags 
coming home due to an unpopular and poorly explained foreign 
adventure, then use of PMC’s and quite possibly the entire 
Colombia policy are not sustainable…120. 
Other concerns are that some actions, mainly mistakes by the PMFs or 
uncontrolled behavior of the employees, could have negative repercussions for 
U.S. foreign policy.  Some missions of PMFs, for example, the involvement of 
Airscan in the bombing of a village where eighteen civilians were killed, could 
backfire with the result that the U.S. government is involved in more fighting than 
intended, all without a prior public discussion.121  The rebels do not distinguish 
between the civilian contractors and the regular forces of the U.S. military.  
Arguably, the use of PMFs – who pilot gunships that return fire during eradication 
missions -- contributed to the fact that the guerrillas see the United States as an 
actor who participates in the armed conflict.122 
One consequence of using PMFs is that the United States faces a partial 
loss of sovereignty as it hands over certain aspects of its foreign and security 
policy to an actor driven by economic interests.  With few personnel assigned to 
control and oversee the activities of the PMFs in Colombia, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the implementation of the intended political will may not always 
be assured as profit driven companies may act differently than state institutions 
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do.  PMFs are limited by the financial scope of the contract and, as a result, tailor 
their activities accordingly.  This could mean that in order to achieve the largest 
profit, the PMF may choose the cheapest solution – rather than the best and 
most effective -- whereas public institutions like the military often have a different 
approach.123  For example, it became public that prior to several crashes of 
aircrafts operated by the PMF California Microwave Systems in Colombia, 
employees and pilots raised concerns that the single engine Cessna 208 is not 
powerful enough for missions in mountainous terrain.  They considered it too 
risky to fly with this underpowered aircraft and recommended the replacement of 
the Cessna with the twin-engine Beech King Air 300.  This switch was rejected 
by the company because of the higher costs of that aircraft.124 
The delegation of foreign policy implementation to private actors might be 
acceptable if the United States were able to oversee PMF activities effectively.  
However, there are a number of indications that this is not the case.  The GAO, 
for example, has determined that the Department of Defense has problems with 
the oversight of contractors which support deployed U.S. forces.  According to 
GAO, this is a long-standing problem of the Department and it exists throughout 
the whole organization.125 In the case of Colombia, another GAO report suggests 
that the State Department has been effective in overseeing the aviation program 
which DynCorp plays the central role in.126  With the focus on Colombia, the 
GAO held interviews with officials of DOS, the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, and U.S. 
government and DynCorp officials at on-site locations in Florida and Colombia.  
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In addition, the GAO inspected relevant documents and contract evaluation 
reports.127  The overall findings of the investigation were that the State 
Department Office of Aviation did execute its oversight over DynCorp by regularly 
gaining information about DynCorp’s performance though frequent 
communication and by submitting a follow on evaluation of the performance on a 
monthly basis.128 
Despite this positive finding that the formal procedures of oversight were 
followed, there is reason to doubt the ultimate effectiveness of the process.  In an 
internal memo, the State Department’s director of aviation in the Bureau of 
International Narcotics, John McLaughlin, argues that the State Department is 
incapable of adequately overseeing the Aviation Program.  He notes that the 
department has an “inherent inability to provide knowledgeable oversight and 
support for technical and operational programs.”129  In particular, McLaughlin 
argues that DOS is not capable of fully understanding the complexity of certain 
missions of its Air Wing.  He makes a forthright statement saying that: “Dodging 
trees and ground fire over jungle terrain at 200 mph is not diplomacy, and 
diplomats cannot be expected to fully comprehend the complexity of the task and 
the level of support required.”130 
Relying on PMFs also leads to a partial loss of sovereignty as the state 
shares its monopoly on the legitimate use of force with a private actor.131  The 
U.S. government emphasizes that the PMFs in Colombia only serve in the 
support sector and do not participate in combat operations.  However, the 
execution of search and rescue missions and reports about employees of 
DynCorp using weapons in Colombia show that there is a gap between theory 
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and reality.  Some news reports even suggest that DynCorp personnel play an 
active role in counterinsurgency missions in the south of Colombia, the 
stronghold of the FARC.132  Furthermore, it could be argued that maintaining and 
operating weapons systems and gathering intelligence information are crucial 
elements for the execution of force. 
C. LACK OF LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY  
The use of PMFs also creates dilemmas of regulation and accountability.  
In particular, there are few national or international laws that govern the actions 
of PMFs, creating situations where PMFs engage in wrongdoing and are not held 
accountable.  A few examples from Colombia illustrate this point. 
In order to protect their pipeline in Colombia, Occidental Petroleum and 
Ecopetrol hired a private military company, the Florida-based Airscan.  According 
to the contract, Airscan should provide reconnaissance and aerial security as the 
pipeline was subject to rebel attacks.   In one instance, the pilots of Airscan 
coordinated an airstrike against a suspected rebel stronghold by providing target 
information to Colombian air force attack planes.  During this attack, which 
mistakenly targeted the wrong village, eighteen civilians were killed, among them 
nine children.  The U.S. embassy in Colombia did not support the investigation of 
this incident, which happened in 1998, even though the Colombian government 
asked for assistance.133  In the end, none of the employees of Airscan was held 
accountable and consequently none received any kind of punishment for their 
mistakes.134 
Another example is provided by the outcome of a lawsuit the International 
Labor Rights Fund filed against DynCorp in September 11, 2001, on behalf of 
10,000 Ecuadorian peasant farmers and Amazonian Indians.  The complaint is 
against the company’s aerial spraying of fields with herbicides near the 
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Colombian-Ecuadorian border in January and February 2001.  Although the U.S. 
government tends to dismiss the harmfulness of the herbicide to humans, there 
is some basis to believe that the ingestion of the spray (either directly or through 
the contamination of drinking water) could cause some harm.  In fact, some news 
reports indicate that pesticide drift has already caused more than 1,100 cases of 
illness including two cases which ended fatally.135 In the lawsuit, the plaintiffs 
argue that DynCorp violated the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) and the Torture 
Victim Protection Act (TVPA).136  The case was finally dismissed by the Court of 
the District of Colombia in the United States.  However, this case got the 
attention of the U.N. Working Group on the question of the use of mercenaries 
because DynCorp claimed that “it is necessary to keep in mind that the ATCA 
and the TVPA don’t cover the behavior of the private corporations.”137 For the 
Working Group this argument implies “that some States could be hiring PMSCs 
in order to avoid direct legal responsibilities” and it calls attention to the need to 
establish national and international legislation regarding PMFs.138 
There is limited legal leverage to hold PMFs or their employees 
accountable in case something goes wrong as international law as well as 
national law of most countries fail to address the phenomenon of PMFs.  
Employees of PMFs are not subject to military jurisdiction unless Congress 
declares war on a country and civilian contractors support U.S troops in that 
country.139  They also are in a grey zone under the Geneva Conventions as they 
are neither soldiers nor, regarding the full definition, mercenaries.  International 
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law and regulations have not reacted adequately, yet, to regulate the wide variety 
of private military companies.  One reason is that the majority of PMFs offer 
services which seem to be not directly linked with combat activities.  This is 
especially true for Military Support Firms which were discussed in the second 
chapter.  The support sector is the largest sector of PMF activities, however, it 
draws the least public attention.  The common misunderstanding is that logistics 
and supply are not part of combat activities.  However, without these services it 
would not be possible for fighting troops to carry out their missions. 
The lack of international law brings the dilemma of regulation to the 
national level even though PMFs act internationally.  However, “all but a few 
states’ domestic statutes currently ignore PMFs’ very existence.”140  
Furthermore, PMFs often operate in weak or failed states where local authorities 
may not be capable of enforcing the rule of law.  This is the case in Colombia 
where the rule of law is generally considered to be quite weak.  In addition to the 
weakness of the state there are other reasons why misbehavior of PMFs and 
their employees sometimes is not prosecuted.  On the one hand the Colombian 
government is interested in not endangering the relationship with the United 
States by prosecuting U.S. citizens.  On the other hand, the operations of the 
PMFs are concentrated against domestic groups which oppose the state and 
therefore the government tolerates a certain level of misbehavior or criminal acts 
against these groups.  In Colombia, until recently, the military had a long history 
of violating human rights when fighting against these groups. 
One might assume that U.S. laws would apply to PMFs based in the 
United States, however, this has not usually been the case for activities which 
take place outside of U.S. territory.  The 2000 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Act represents a first effort by the U.S. Congress to close the gap of missing 
laws.  The Act establishes that the Military Code of Justice should be applied to 
civilians who serve in U.S. military operations which take place outside of U.S. 
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territory.  The flaw, however, is that the Act only addresses civilian contractors 
who are hired by the U.S. Department of Defense and who work on U.S. military 
facilities.141  Other civilians who are hired by other clients, for example the 
Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, or foreign states, are not 
affected by this regulation.  Furthermore, as a Judge Advocate with the U.S. 
Marine Corps states, “the law itself still is not fleshed out and no one is quite sure 
how and when to apply it.”142  One consequence could be that employees act in 
a vacuum of law where they do not expect prosecution for criminal activities. 
This legal vacuum can also have negative implications for the employees 
of PMFs because international conventions and laws do not only regulate the 
behavior of combatants but also determine their rights.  The status of civilian 
contractors who fall into captivity is not explicitly regulated.  Therefore it is not 
assured that they receive treatment according to international humanitarian law 
but, rather, may be treated as criminals.143  In February 2003 an intelligence 
plane hired by the U.S. government crashed in Colombia over FARC territory.  
Three men, all employees of the PMF California Microwave Systems, were taken 
hostage by the rebels.  The rebels granted them the status of prisoners of war144, 
in order to bolster their claim that the country is in a state of war and that the 
insurgents should be granted “belligerent” status by the international community. 
Despite this, the hostages’ official legal status has not been clarified nor have the 
responsibilities of the involved companies towards their employees been  
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determined in regard to that situation.  This irregularity stems from the fact that 
ten days after the capture the contracts of the men were transferred to a newly 
formed company, CIAO, INC.145 
A further problem is that due to their structure many companies have the 
possibility to transform, meaning to dissolve and recreate within a short period of 
time, in order to escape regulation and prosecution.146  They can either move to 
another country or rename themselves which, for example, the South African 
company Executive Outcomes did in 1998 after domestic regulation of PMFs was 
on the agenda of the South African government.  Bigger companies which have 
not the possibility to dissolve within a short period of time can transform to 
several smaller companies to avoid certain aspects of regulation. 
The preceding examples illustrate how diffuse and unclear the legal 
situation of PMFs is and how responsibility and accountability is shifted from one 
actor to another with no one accepting them.  To implement international laws 
which clearly regulate the matters of PMFs, a common political will of the 
international community of nations is mandatory. 
D. ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE CONGRESS AND PUBLIC 
The use of PMFs has direct implications for the democratic system where 
the Congress is a controlling institution of the Executive branch.  It is a system of 
checks and balances by which Congress participates in foreign policy decision 
making and oversees its implementation.147  The public plays an important role in 
this system too, as think tanks and other citizen groups monitor government (and 
Congressional) activity by demanding and reviewing information on government 
activities.   This system, however, is undermined by the use of PMFs as a tool for 
foreign policy in a number of ways.  In particular, the difficulty of gaining 
information about the activities of PMFs greatly reduces the ability of the 
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legislature or the public to monitor foreign policy.  For example, in the early stage 
of Plan Colombia the Pentagon, upon a request under the Freedom of 
Information Act, did not reveal the contract of MPRI’s engagement in Colombia.  
The request asked for information on all MPRI contracts in Latin America.  
Neither DOD nor DOS nor MPRI released the contract due to “proprietary 
reasons.”148 
In order to oversee policy implementation, Congress needs to be informed 
about the actions of the government.  While in general the executive branch is 
not required to report on contracts with PMFs that are under $50 million,149 in the 
case of Colombia Congress imposed much stricter reporting requirements.  Upon 
approving the funds for Plan Colombia in July 2000, Congress articulated its 
requirements for information.  Notably, the President is required to submit a 
bimonthly classified report to Congress containing the number, locations, 
activities and lengths of assignments of U.S military and civilian contractor 
personnel.150 
Additional reporting requirements were introduced under the 2003 Foreign 
Relations authorization bill, which obliges the Department of State to compile an 
annual report which identifies U.S. businesses hired by DOS or DOD in support 
of counternarcotics activities in Colombia.  These reports must provide the 
following information: 
a) Name of U.S. business and description of the counternarcotics 
activities; 
b) Total value of all payments by DOS and DOD for such activities; 
c) A statement justifying the decision to contract for services; 
d) Assessment of risk to personal safety of contractor workers; and 
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e) Plan to transfer activities to Colombian nationals151 
The kind of information requested suggests that Congress shares a 
number of the concerns discussed in the preceding section, namely the dangers 
of putting contractors in risky situations and a worry that the U.S. government is 
spending money on contractors rather than investing in partner nation capacity. 
One might assume based on these reporting requirements that Congress 
is well informed about activities of PMFs in Colombia, however, this seems not to 
be the case.  The description of activities is kept in general terms.  If members of 
Congress want to have more information they have to investigate on their own.  
This, however, is even for them no easy act.  “Members of Congress have a hell 
of a time getting information about DynCorp and other contractors,” complains 
Representative Janice Schakowsky.152 
Efforts to get detailed information on contracts between the U.S. 
government and DynCorp have been blocked in order to protect DynCorp’s 
commercial secrets.  DynCorp argues that this measure is necessary in order to 
maintain its competitiveness on the security market (e.g., cost-per-employee 
figures, which could be used by DynCorp’s competitors to underbid it in the 
future).153  According to a company spokesman, DynCorp acknowledges the 
need for more accountability, however, for the interest of its client, the U.S. 
government, the company prefers to “seek a low profile.154  The government is 
also reluctant to provide anything but the minimally required information.  In fact, 
the State Department initially opposed Congress’s request for an annual report 
on contractors, arguing that the Department “cannot easily track and report on 
DOD's contract activities” and citing their concern that “recurrent, public reporting 
of the names of businesses under contract to the Department of State to support 
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counternarcotics activities is likely to increase the security risks to these 
businesses and their employees both in Colombia and the United States.”155 
Private companies are not obliged to report to Congress like other state 
institutions are.  There is no public control over the contracts between the client 
and the company.  Additionally, the U.S. government and the civilian contractors 
are very conservative in providing detailed information about known operations of 
PMFs.  For example, presently only two of the annually required reports to 
Congress about contractor support for counternarcotics activities in Colombia are 
accessible to the public; the first, covering FY2002 contracts and the last, 
released in June 2007, covering FY2006 contracts.156  Even though it is no 
secret that the U.S. government uses PMFs in Colombia, DynCorp employees 
who are stationed at the San Jose del Guaviare military base in southern 
Colombia are strictly forbidden from discussing their missions with the media.157  
Staying “below the radar” is obviously the company’s policy.  Being secretive is 
good for the business and increases the chances for further contracts.  Or as 
Colonel Schumacher, a retired Special Forces Officer puts it: “If you do things 
quiet enough, you’ll continue to get more business from the U.S. government.”158 
Finally, PMFs shape foreign policy decision making in a way that is not 
transparent to the public and thus reduces the accountability of policy makers to 
their constituents.  Some of the PMF influence is exerted through the Congress 
via lobbying and campaign donations. In 2001, the private military industry spent 
more than $32 million on lobbying and contributed more than $12 millions to 
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political campaigns.  DynCorp was one of the top ten donors among PMFs, 
giving more than $500,000 to the Republican Party between 1999 and 2002.159 
Much of the influence, however, comes from incestuous contacts between 
former government officials on the board of directors of PMFs and their erstwhile 
colleagues who remain in office.  The excellent connections of some PMFs, for 
example MPRI, to the Pentagon and the Department of State have already been 
pointed out.  Many former high ranked military and civilian personnel of these 
institutions are employees or even founders of PMFs and they use their old 
contacts to the benefits of the companies.  The Board of Directors of DynCorp 
now contains many of they key government players (now retired) in eradication 
efforts in Colombia, with their high-level connections.  These include Marc 
Grossman, former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs who participated in 
the implementation of Plan Colombia and advocated DynCorp for aerial spraying; 
and General Barry McCaffrey, ex-chief U.S. Southern Command (retired 1996) 
who helped to develop Plan Colombia while he served as “drug czar” (director of 
the Office of National Drug Control Policy).  Other directors (without connections 
to Colombia) include Admiral Joseph W. Prueher (retired 1999) and General 
Anthony Zinni (retired 2000). 
E. CONCLUSION 
As this chapter has shown, the use of PMFs in Colombia by the United 
States is not without problems and in some instances runs counter to the political 
intentions of U.S. foreign and security policy, despite executive and 
congressional efforts to monitor the PMFs.  One goal of U.S. engagement in 
Colombia is the strengthening of democracy and the training of local Colombian 
forces.  However, extensive use of PMFs is arguably counter productive to that 
goal as military-to-military contact is weakened and as contractors have been 
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used for long periods, in lieu of developing Colombia capabilities.  The fact that 
PMFs lure personnel from local national forces into the private industry with 
attractive financial offers also does not contribute to the goal of strengthening 
national forces. 
In addition, the executive branch faces other problems when it delegates 
the implementation of its foreign policy to private actors: a loss of a monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force, cost ineffectiveness (overbilling), and the risk of illegal 
or risky behavior by PMFs.  These problems are exacerbated by shortcomings in 
the executive branch’s ability to oversee the actions of PMFs, either because the 
issue is neglected altogether (as is the case with the Department of Defense) or 
because of lack of expertise (as was the case with the Department of State and 
DynCorp). 
The chapter has also shown that national and international laws need to 
be adjusted in order to regulate the accountability of private military companies.  
This is not only important for the United States as negative repercussions on the 
international level could be avoided but also for the employees of PMFs hired by 
the United States so that they have an official, legal status. 
Most importantly, the chapter shows that PMFs severely undermine the 
ability of the Congress and the public to oversee the implementation of foreign 
policy.  It is even more remarkable that this is the case with U.S. policy towards 
Colombia, since Congress requires the executive branch to provide far much 
more information about contractor activity in Colombia than in almost any other 
case.  Finally, the chapter has shown that PMFs do not only execute but also 
shape to a certain degree foreign and security policy.  With good connections to 
the Pentagon and to high state officials, and by lobbying and funding political 
campaigns, the private military industry is able to incorporate its economic 
interests into the foreign and security policy of the United States. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
PMFs have come to play an increasingly important role throughout the 
world and in the execution of U.S. foreign and security policy since the end of the 
Cold War.  In response to this development, the academic and policy community 
has engaged in a heated debate over the pros and cons of relying on PMFs, 
mostly in Africa and in other areas (like Iraq) where the United States has had a 
limited historical presence.  This thesis extends the debate to U.S. policy in 
Colombia, which has been characterized by an enormous military and financial 
effort to combat the drug trade and the violence of terrorist groups, which are 
heavily involved in the drug business.  PMFs play a major role in the fight against 
drugs, particularly in the U.S.-funded aerial eradication program.  In addition, the 
United States has relied on PMFs to assist in the transformation of the defense 
sector, which was a key part of Plan Colombia.  Given the importance of 
Colombia to U.S. foreign policy, it is essential to determine whether PMFs have 
contributed to or undermined U.S. objectives in the country. 
U.S. reliance on PMFs in Colombia was chosen as a case study because, 
in many ways, it is a “least likely” case to experience the abuses or 
transgressions that typically plague the sector. PMFs in Colombia do not provide 
warfighting capabilities, but rather operational support and consulting services, 
which are presumably less prone to abuse.  The State Department had been 
engaged in significant contracts with PMFs since at least 1991, allowing it time to 
create procedures and develop expertise in overseeing the sector during a period 
of relative calm.  In addition, U.S. assistance to Colombia was a key foreign 
policy issue prior to 9/11 and, as such, received a great deal of scrutiny from 
Congress and the public.  The U.S. Embassy in Colombia was well positioned to 
oversee the activities of U.S.-funded PMFs within the country, in contrast to the 
situation in post-conflict or newly democratic countries where there is little history 
of a U.S. presence.  Finally, while a great deal of aid was provided to Colombia, it 
did not reach the staggering level of spending in Iraq, which is presumably harder 
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to monitor.  If, despite these expectations, the use of PMFs in Colombia proves 
to be problematic (i.e., has more costs than benefits), we should be especially 
concerned with the increasing reliance of the United States on the private military 
industry for the implementation of its foreign policy objectives.  If, in contrast, the 
U.S. has been able to use PMFs effectively in Colombia, then it might provide 
some useful lessons for how PMFs might be employed in an accountable fashion 
elsewhere in the world. 
The third chapter concentrated on Colombia and on some selected private 
military companies which were hired by the United States.  Concerning PMFs, 
the main focus was on the companies MPRI and DynCorp which were hired to 
conduct completely different tasks in Colombia.  Hired to provide advisory and 
consulting service, MPRI did not meet the expectations of the Colombian 
government, resulting in the termination of the contract prior to the planned 
timeframe.  The other private military company, DynCorp, is the main private 
implementer of drug eradication programs in Colombia (as well as Bolivia and 
Peru).  As the third chapter pointed out, PMFs do not always act according to the 
contracts or existing legal limitations and restrictions.  With a reduced number of 
State Department personnel to oversee and control the activities of PMFs, 
specifically DynCorp, those limitations and restrictions are prone to be 
circumnavigated by PMFs in Colombia.  Furthermore, DynCorp has been 
engaged in a firefight with rebels despite the restriction that private companies 
are not supposed to participate in combat.  The fact that on behalf of the U.S 
side, namely the State Department, no statements or more information about that 
incident have been issued, leads to the assumption that even though combat 
activities by PMFs are officially not supported, they are at least tolerated to a 
certain amount.  This, however, could lead to the conclusion that the United 
States does not only use PMFs as a tool in the execution of its foreign and 
security policy how it is known publicly but that private military companies are 
also used in missions hidden from public view. 
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The fourth chapter examines the costs and benefits of relying on PMFs 
and finds that the use of the private military industry is not without problems even 
for states with strong institutions like the United States.  By delegating certain 
aspects of its foreign and security policy to a private actor, the state reduces its 
sovereignty and its monopoly on the legitimate use of force.  Aggravating that 
situation is that this new actor is not adequately addressed in national and 
international laws.  Furthermore, heavy reliance on PMFs could lead to a 
dependency on the private military industry which could create problems for the 
state as well as for the military.  In the long run the military loses certain 
capabilities if PMFs take over certain tasks of the regular forces and the state 
consequently needs then to rely more on PMFs.  This may create a vicious circle 
of dependency, especially when the private military industry is able to increase its 
influence on political decisions by lobbying and campaign sponsoring.  
Additionally, in democratic systems like the one in the United States where the 
concept of checks and balances prevails, which is seen as a guarantee of the 
democratic system, control mechanisms could be undermined with a high 
reliance on private military companies.  The consequences are that the balance 
of power shifts in favor to the Executive as the Legislature loses parts of its 
power.  In sum, even though PMFs have been subject to much greater regulation 
in the Colombian case than in other instances, the executive branch lacks the 
ability to oversee their activities adequately and there is still a significant deficit of 
accountability to the Congress and the public. 
Overall, despite the problems with the use of PMFs which emerge for the 
state and the democratic system, it is unlikely that the state will rely less on this 
sector.  The opposite is happening as over the last years the private military 
industry experienced a boom.  Consequently, the international community should 
turn its attention to this issue and develop regulations and programs so that 
negative implications can be avoided.  Some critics of PMFs have proposed 
legislation that prohibits the use of U.S. funds for contracts with PMFs in the 
Andean region (e.g., Representative Jan Schakowsky’s 2001 proposed Andean 
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Region Contractor Accountability Act H.R. 1591).160 This is not feasible, 
however, as PMFs play a vital role in U.S. foreign policy towards Colombia and 
elsewhere.  It is doubtful if not impossible to continue, for example, the coca 
eradication program without the support of DynCorp.  Therefore it is necessary to 
focus on regulation and oversight rather than on initiatives ending all cooperation 
with PMFs. 
In order to deal with the subject of regulation, four elements must be 
addressed by the international community as well as by individual states: 
International recognition and standards: The international community has 
to acknowledge the existence of the private military industry.  Still, there are 
states which ignore the existence of PMFs and therefore see no need to 
implement laws which regulate their activities.  International standards have to be 
developed with a consensus about definitions and functions of private military 
companies.  However, the Special Rapporteur of the UN mentioned in several 
reports that still no consensus about a definition of mercenaries and private 
military companies exists in the international community.  Furthermore, the 
reports state that there is an urgent need to regulate PMFs in order to increase 
accountability.161   
Improvement of transparency: The private military industry mostly 
operates below the horizon of public attention.  Contracts between the agent and 
the principal (the state), however, need to be made available to the Legislature in 
order to improve political oversight.  This applies whether the client is a state 
institution or a private enterprise.  In the United States, the Congress is only 
required to be notified of PMF involvement when the financial scope of an 
individual contract exceeds $50 million, a “tripwire” that can easily be 
circumvented with multiple contracts below that amount. This limit needs to be 
                                            
160 The Center for Public Integrity “Colombia: Outsourcing War.” 
161 For more information see: United Nations, “The right of peoples to self-determination and 
its application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation,”; United 
Nations, “Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of 
the right of peoples to self –determination.” 
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lowered so that legislative oversight is increased.  Furthermore, Congress should 
consider introducing a mandatory reporting level based on the amount of hired 
personnel and length of the assignment. 
Indeed, the regulations and reporting requirements the Congress imposed 
on PMFs in Colombia should be codified and extended to all other cases – after 
correcting for their shortcomings.  Since PMFs see themselves as legal business 
enterprises they should, like other “normal” companies be obliged to reveal 
information about financial activities.  The Legislature should determine what 
constitutes “proprietary information”, e.g. special training techniques or tactical 
procedures, in the private military industry.  This may change depending on the 
service for which the company is hired.  If sensitive data are involved, a 
committee which is eligible to oversee proprietary or classified data has to be 
established in order to guarantee Congressional oversight.  Unclassified data 
should be made accessible to public in order to strengthen public oversight within 
the democratic system. 
Erection of controlling mechanisms: PMF contracts must be checked by 
competent controlling boards which are familiar with the private military industry 
and legal issues. Within executive agencies, controlling boards should be created 
which examine the contracts and other related documents in order to ensure 
compliance with national and international laws.  Furthermore, these boards 
should function as a system which monitors the activities of PMFs.  In the past, 
the GAO has provided some studies on the accountability of PMFs.  However, 
these studies are not carried out on a regular basis but rather conducted in 
response to a request from Congress.  The introduction of controlling boards, 
obliged to provide reports on a regular basis could not only improve oversight but 
would give the Legislature an opportunity to react faster if there is a need for 
intervention. 
Implementation of a sanctioning system: In case of misbehavior of PMF 
employees or non-compliance with the contract by PMFs, sanctions must be  
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available.  Depending on the severity of non-compliance, the sanctioning system 
needs several levels ranging from, for example, financial penalties to revoking of 
the license to conduct business. 
Sanctions are an important tool for guaranteeing the compliance of PMFs 
with contracts and existing regulations.  Critics of PMFs in Colombia repeatedly 
complain that the United States does not punish DynCorp in cases of 
misbehavior.  The heavy reliance on DynCorp in the eradication program, with no 
apparent alternative, leads to the conclusion that the U.S. government is in a 
certain way willing to accept certain irregularities.  This, however, undermines 
any attempts taken to increase accountability of PMFs. 
As mentioned previously, the increased reliance on the private military 
industry and its influence on foreign and security policy also has implications for 
political science.  More research to investigate this influence is necessary to 
understand certain processes in regard to the monopoly of force and the effects 
upon sovereignty as some of them are relatively new since the end of the Cold 
War.  And finally, to complete the picture of the private military industry and the 
use of PMFs, empirical studies in the financial sector regarding the cost 
efficiency of PMFs versus state institutions surely would be very interesting.  This 
could help state institutions decide whether and what kind of service should be 
outsourced into the private sector. 
 
 65
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Adams, Thomas K. “Private Military Companies: Mercenaries for the 21st 
Century.” in Non-State Threats and Future Wars, ed. Robert J. Bunker, 
London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 2003. 
 
The Associated Press, “US DC: End Sought to Cocaine Contractors,” Media 
Awareness Project, May 7, 2001. 
http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v01/n805/a05.html [May 13, 2007]. 
 
Avant, Deborah D. “Mercenaries.” Foreign Policy, Jul/Aug 2004. 
 
Avant, Deborah D. “Privatizing Military Training.” Foreign Policy in Focus, 
Volume 5, No 17, June 2000. 
 
Avant, Deborah D. The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatization 
Security. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
 
Bouvier, Virginia M. “Colombia Quagmire: Time for U.S. Policy Overhaul,” 
International Relations Center Americas Program, September 2003. 
http://americas.irc-online.org/briefs/2003/0309colombia.html [access May 
13, 2007]. 
 
Brooks, Doug. “Help for Beleaguered Peacekeepers.” Washington Post, June 2, 
2003. http://www.hoosier84.com/030502wpoped.pdf [access March 10, 
2007]. 
 
Burton-Rose, Daniel and Madsen, Wayne. “Corporate Soldiers: The U.S. 
Government Privatizes the Use of Force.” Multinational Monitor, March 
1999, 20, 3. 
 
Business Wire, “DynCorp International Again wins State Department Contract for 
Narcotics Eradication and Interdiction.” May 19, 2005. 
 
Campbell, Gordon L., “Contractors on the Battlefield: The Ethics of Paying 
Civilians to Enter Harm's Way and Requiring Soldiers to Depend upon 
Them.” A paper prepared for presentation to the Joint Services 
Conference on Professional Ethics 2000 Springfield, VA, January 27-28, 
2000. http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE00/Campbell00.html [access 





Castillo, Lourdes A., “Waging War with Civilians. Asking the Unanswered 
Questions.” Aerospace Power Journal, Fall 2000. 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/fal00/castillo.ht
m [access May 9, 2007]. 
 
The Center for International Policy’s.  
“2004: The ‘troop cap’ debate,” October 8, 2004. 
http://ciponline.org/colombia/04cap.htm [access May 27, 2007]. 
 
 “House Committee Preserves the “Cap” on U.S. Personnel in Colombia.” 
May 13, 2004. http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/040513cap.htm [access 
March 29, 2007]. 
 
 “House Republicans Want to Abolish Colombia ‘Troop Cap,’ “ May 11, 
2004. http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/040511cap.htm [access May 27, 
2007]. 
 
 “Report on Certain Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia.” April 14, 
2003. http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/03041401.htm [access April 14, 
2007]. 
 
“State Department Fact Sheet: Civilian Contractors and U.S. Military 
Personnel Supporting Plan Colombia,” May 22, 2001. 
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/052201.htm [access June 12, 2007]. 
 
“U.S. Government fact sheet and reports,” at 
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aidgovt.htm [access June 15, 2007]. 
 
The Center for Public Integrity. “Colombia: Outsourcing War.” 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/report.aspx?aid=261 [access March 24, 
2007]. 
 
The Center for Public Integrity. “Top Contractors by Dollars.” 
http://store.publicintegrity.org/pns/list.aspx?act=top [access April 14, 
2007]. 
 
Cillier, Gaston and Freeman, Laurie. “Potential Threat: The new OAS Concept of 
Hemispheric Security.” WOLA Special Report, July 2005. 
 
Cook, Colleen W. “Colombia: Issues for Congress,” in CRS Report for Congress, 
updated December 13, 2006, 
 
Friesendorf, Cornelius. “Drogen, Krieg und Drogenkrieg- Die USA und Kolumbien 




Gleijeses, Piero. Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-
1976. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2002. 
 
Grant, Bruce D. “U.S. Military Expertise For Sale: Private Military Consultants As 
A Tool Of Foreign Policy.” U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 
January 18, 1998. http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA344357&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf 
[access March 6, 2007]. 
 
Guaqueta, Alexandra. “Political and Economic Dimensions of the Colombian 
Conflict,” Paper written within the framework of the Economic Agendas in 
Civil Wars research program of the International Peace Academy in New 
York, 2002. 
 
Isacson, Adam. “Congress Doubles the Limit on U.S. Troops in Colombia.” The 
Center for International Policy’s, October 8, 2004. 
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/041008cap.htm [access March 29, 
2007]. 
 
Isacson, Adam. Memorandum to “Preserve the “cap” on the U.S. military 
presence I Colombia.” March 16, 2004. 
http://ciponline.org/colombia/040322cap.pdf [access March 29, 2007]. 
 
Isacson, Adam. “The Colombian Dilemma- After half a century of fighting, can a 
fragile peace process succeed?” International Policy Report, February 
2000. http://www.ciponline.org/coipr/coipr001.pdf [access February 27, 
2007]. 
 
Isenberg, David. “A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic Assessment 
of Private Military Companies in Iraq,” British American Security 
Information Council, Research Report 2004.4, September 2004. 
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004PMC.pdf [access May 2, 
2007]. 
 
House of Commons. “Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation,” 
London: The Stationary Office, 2002. 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/mercenaries,0.pdf [access May 03, 2007]. 
 
Leander, Anna. “The Market for Force and Public Security: The Destabilizing 
Consequences of Private Military Companies.” Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol. 42, No 5, 2005. 
 
 68
Karsin, Nicole Elana. „Escalating U.S. Casualties in Colombia.” Colombia Journal 
Online, April 14, 2003. http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia154.htm 
[access May 15, 2007]. 
 
Kinsey, Christopher. “Private Military Companies: Options for Regulating Private 
Military Services in the United Kingdom,” British American Security 
Information Council, September 07, 2005. 
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN050907.htm [access May 03, 2007]. 
 
Kurtenbach, Sabine. “Kolumbien.” Studien zur länderbezogenen Konfliktanalyse 
der Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Oktober 2004. http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/iez/02954.pdf [access March 21, 2007]. 
 
Markusen, Ann. “The Case Against Privatizing National Security,” paper 
presented at the Study Group on the Arms Trade and the 
Transnationalization of the Defense Industry, New York, October 1, 1999, 
revised, January 2001. 
http://archive.epinet.org/real_media/010111/materials/markusen-doc.pdf 
[access May 9, 2007]. 
 
McKinney, Cynthia. “Inquiry Into Private Military Companies in Colombia.” Open 
letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell, March 15, 2001. 
http://www.1worldcommunication.org/privatemilitarycompanies.htmhttp://e
vakreisky.at/onlinetexte/pm.pdf [access May 22, 2007]. 
 
Miller, T. Christian “Colombia: Use of Foreign Pilots Avoids Drug War Policy;” 
Contra Costa Times, August 18, 2001, cited at Media Awareness Project. 
http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v01/n1516/a11.html [access May 23, 
2007]. 
 
Montague, Dena. “The Business of War and the Prospects for Peace in Sierra 
Leone.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume IX, Issue 1, Spring 
2002. 
 
Robert Novak, “Does State Department need its own air force?” The Chicago 
Sun-Times, September 25, 2003. 
 
Posture Statement of Admiral James G. Stavridis, United States Commander, 
United States Southern Command before the 110th Congress. House 
Armed Service Committee, March 21, 2007. 
 
Robberson, Tod. “Afghanistan deal could net DynCorp over $2.1B,” The Dallas 
Morning News, February 9, 2007. 
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/world/stories/122406
dnintdyncorp_colombia.3b3cdf08.html [access June 15, 2007]. 
 69
Robberson, Tod. “DynCorp has big role, little oversight in war efforts,” The Dallas 
Morning News, February 9, 2007. 
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/world/stories/122406
dnintldyncorp.32c4b08.html [access June 15, 2007]. 
 
Ropp, Theodore. War in the Modern World. Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2000. 
 
Sack, Kevin. Rachel Van Dongen and T. Christian Miller. “Pilots Voiced Doubts 
About Planes in Colombia Crashes; U.S. contract workers said the single-
engine Cessnas involved in two recent accidents were unsuited to the 
Andean terrain.”, The Los Angeles Times, March 27, 2003, cited on 
website of Representative Jan Schakowsky. 
http://www.house.gov/schakowsky/article_03_27_03pilotscolombia.html 
[access April 24, 2007]. 
 
Serafino, Nina M. “Colombia: Conditions and U.S. Policy Options.” CRS Report 
for Congress, updated February 12, 2001. 
 
Serafino, Nina M. “Colombia: Plan Colombia Legislation and Assistance 
(FY2000-FY2001).” CRS Report for Congress, updated July 5, 2001. 
 
Shearer, David. “Outsourcing War. (mercenary organizations).” Foreign Policy, 
Fall 1998. 
http://www.fsa.ulaval.ca/personnel/VernaG/EH/F/cons/lectures/mercenarie
s.htm [access March 10, 2007]. 
 
Silverstein, Ken. “Privatizing War: How affairs of state are outsourced to 
corporations beyond public control.” The Nation, July 28, 1997. 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/silver.htm [access March 10, 2007]. 
 
Singer, P.W. Corporate Warriors-The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003. 
 
Singer, P.W. “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and 
Its Ramifications for International Security.” International Security, Vol. 26, 
No. 3, Winter 2001/2002. 
 
Singer, P.W. “Have Guns Will Travel.” New York Times, July 21, 2003. 
http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/fellows/singer20030721.htm 
[access March 13, 2007]. 
 
Singer, P.W. “War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and 
International Law.” Colombia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 42, 2004. 
 
 70
St. Clair, Jeffrey and Cockburn, Alexander. “Ecuador: Farmers Fight DynCorp’s 
Chemwar on the Amazon.” CorpWatch, February 27, 2002, 
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=1988 [access May 14, 2007]. 
 
Testimony of General James T. Hill, Commander, United States Southern 
Command, hearing of the House Armed Services Committee: "Fiscal Year 
2005 National Defense Authorization budget request" March 24, 2004, 
The Center for International Policy’s. 
http://ciponline.org/colombia/040324hill.htm [access May 27, 2007]. 
 
Testimony of Paul E. Simons, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Hearing of the 
Senate International Narcotics Caucus, June 3, 2003. 
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/030603simo.htm [access March 13, 
2007]. 
 
Traynor, Ian “The privatization of war.” The Guardian, December 10, 2003. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,1103566,00.html [access 
May 12, 2007]. 
 
United Nations. “Mission to Ecuador.” Report of the Working Group on the 
question of the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights 
and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, 
A/HRC/4/42/Add.2, February 23, 2007. 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/4session/A-HRC-4-42-
Add-2.pdf [access May 14, 2007]. 
 
United Nations, “The right of peoples to self-determination and its application to 
peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation,” report 
E/CN.4/2005/14 submitted by Shaista Shameem, Special Rapporteur, 
December 8, 2004, p.13, 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/167/92/PDF/G0416792.p
df?OpenElement [access June 15, 2007]. 
 
United Nations. “Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and 
impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self –determination.” 
Report E/CN.4/2004/15 submitted by Mr. Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, 
Special Rapporteur, December 24, 2003. 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/69ecaf81b3a74d8ac1256e







United States Department of State, “International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report,” March 2007. 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2007/vol1/html/80852.htm [access 
June 16, 2007]. 
 
 “Report to Congress on Certain Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia,” 
Report to Congress Certain Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia, 
Submitted to the Congress by the Secretary of State, Pursuant to Section 
694 (b) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 
(Public Law 107-228). FY2002. 
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/03041401.htm [accessed April 14, 
2007]. 
 
“Report to Congress on Certain Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia,” 
Report to Congress Certain Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia, 
Submitted to the Congress by the Secretary of State, Pursuant to Section 
694 (b) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 
(Public Law 107-228) FY2006. 
 
“State Department Aviation Program Wins Federal Award,” Media note, 
Office of the Spokesman, June 29, 2001, at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2001/4003.htm [access June 13, 2007]. 
 
State Department's section-by-section analysis of the foreign relations 
authorization bill that State submitted to the Senate, From the 
Congressional Record, April 3, 2003: Pages S4849 - S4856,” 
http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/108th/s790is-StateAnalysis.htm 
[access June 15, 2007]. 
 
United States Government Accountability Office.  
 
 GAO-01-26. “Drug Control: U.S. Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years 
to Produce Results.” October 2000. 
 
 GAO-01-1021. “Drug Control: State Department Provides Required 
Aviation Program Oversight, but Safety and Security Should Be 
Enhanced.” September 2001. 
 
 GAO-03-695. “Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to 
Deployed Forces but are not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans.” June 
2003. 
 
 GAO-03-783. “Drug Control: Specific Performance Measures and Long-
Term Costs for U.S. Programs in Colombia Have Not been Developed.” 
June 2003. 
 72
GAO-04-918. “Drug Control: Aviation Program Safety Concerns in 
Colombia Are Being Addressed, but State’s Planning and Budgeting 
Process Can Be Improved.” July 2004. 
 
GAO-07-145, “Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to 
Address Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight o 
Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces,” December 2006. 
 
Veillette, Connie. “Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding 
Programs: FY2007 Assistance,” CRS Report for Congress, updated 
November, 2006. 
 
Veillette, Connie. “Plan Colombia: A Progress Report,” CRS Report for 
Congress, updated January 11, 2006. 
 
Vest, Jason. “State Outsources Secret War.” The Nation, 





?symbol=DCP [access June 13, 2007] 
 
Website, “Congressional Concerns Over U.S. Troop Levels in Colombia Persist” 
http://www.usofficeoncolombia.org/media/troopcap.htm [access May 27, 
2007] 
 
Website. Corpwatch. DynCorp-State Department Contract, 
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=676 [access March 02, 2007]. 
 
Website. CorpWatch, “CSC/DynCorp,” 
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?list=type&type=18 [access June 12, 
2007]. 
 
Website. Deutsches Rotes Kreuz. http://www.drk.de/voelkerrecht/ [access March 
13, 2007]. 
 
Website. People’s Daily. “Colombia Identifies Three US Hostages Held by 
FARC.” April 23, 2003. 
http://english.people.com.cn/200304/23/eng20030423_115652.shtml 
[access May 14, 2007]. 
 73
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Professor Jeanne Giraldo 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
4. Professor Thomas Bruneau 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
